Online Appendix

Fostering Soft Skills in Active Labor Market Programs: Evidence from a Large-Scale RCT

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Appendix A Program Details

Employment Circles is an Active Labor Market Program that aims to reintegrate chronically unemployed income-support claimants into the labor force by providing them with personalized treatment through various occupational workshops.

After being assigned to the program, participants start with two individualized meetings with an occupational trainer who diagnoses the participant in terms of employability, level of motivation, and barriers to employment, and makes a recommendation for a specific program track based on this diagnosis. A final decision is then made by the head of the employment office and the caseworker for program participants in the office. The personalized program track is composed of weekly meetings with the caseworker and a combination of some or all of the following four workshops:

- ***Purpose-focused preparatory workshop***
  Designed to prepare individuals with low-to-medium motivation for the job search phase or the personal skills workshop, focusing on improving job search motivation and boosting self-esteem and self-efficacy. Main objectives: increase participant's motivation, identify his/her strengths, and foster his/her career self-image and belief in work capacity. Consists of group sessions and personal meetings, four hours a week (two hours twice a week) for three weeks. Group sessions are devoted to identifying each participant's strengths and skills, familiarizing him/her with different types of work environments, and setting career aspirations and employment goals.
- ***Job placement-focused preparatory workshop***
  Designed to prepare individuals with medium-to-high motivation individuals and those who finished the *Purpose-focused preparatory workshop* for the job search phase while focusing on providing job-seeking skills. Consists of group sessions and two-hour personal meetings held twice a week for three weeks. Content includes fostering self-introduction skills, acquiring job search skills with emphasis on entry-level jobs, writing a résumé, and job-interview and assessment-center simulations. At the meetings, each participant defines a set of entry-level jobs and builds a program to achieve the job search goals.
- ***Personal skills workshop***
  An intensive workshop designed to build a career path and foster self-motivation, work self-efficacy, and interpersonal skills of program participants with low-to-medium job readiness. Consists of group sessions and personal meetings, ten hours per week (five hours twice per week) for six weeks. Content includes vocational guidance, positive self-talk, conflict resolution, dealing with personal obstacles and new tasks, better handling of feedback, and fostering excellence on the job. The workshop employs structured group dynamics as a core pedagogical tool to build social support and push participants to progress together as a group.
- ***Job search workshop and group coaching***
  Supervised proactive job search in a computer lab, four hours per week for up to four months. Under professional guidance, participants design a job search program that reflects their individual capabilities and aspirations and are encouraged to search for suitable entry-level jobs that that offer

potential for occupational mobility and wage growth. The meetings include both group and individualized coaching to provide feedback and group support in the job search process.

Program participants must report to the employment office three times per week: twice for workshop participation and once for an individual meeting with their caseworker. The workshops are conducted by qualified occupational trainers and coaches who provide each participant with the personal attention needed to identify and remove the obstacles that stand in the way of his/her success in the workplace.

Appendix B - Additional Results

B1. Individual Fixed Effects

We exploit the longitudinal nature of our data to estimate program effects using an individual fixed effects model, comparing outcomes in the twelve months before and after randomization. Specifically, we examine the differential changes between treatment and control groups in both cumulative income and months employed across these periods. This model can be expressed as follows:

$$(2)\ Outcome_{i\tau} = \beta_1 + \beta_2\, Treatment_i + \beta_3 post_\tau + \beta_4\, Treatment_i \times post_\tau + \delta_i + \varepsilon_{i\tau},$$

where $Outcome_{i\tau}$ is the outcome of jobseeker *i* in period τ (i.e., the year preceding/following the randomization); $Treatment_i$ is the indicator for whether jobseeker *i* was assigned to treatment; $post_\tau$ denotes the post-randomization period; and δ_i are individual fixed effects.

The estimates, reported in Appendix Table B1, show that the program induced participants to work one additional month (s.e. = 0.188) and earn NIS 2,366 (s.e. = 916) more than non-participants during the first twelve months after their being assigned to the program. This reflects a 30% increase in employment and a 19% increase in annual labor income, relative to the control group. The program led to a decrease of similar magnitude in annual income support (NIS 2,559), leaving the total annual income unchanged. These results are reassuring because they strongly resemble the cumulative outcome estimates reported in Table 3, further supporting the ignorability assumption.

B2. Externalities

In addition to its direct effects on its participants and indirect effects on their partners, the program might have potential indirect effects on non-participants. It may affect their behavior and options when competing with treated participants in the labor market or the firms that employ them. Such externalities make take the form of displacement effects (i.e., program participants taking jobs at non-participants' expense—see, e.g., Blundell, Costa Dias, and Meghir 2003; Crépon et al. 2013) or general equilibrium effects through impacts on wages or vacancies (e.g., Gautier et al. 2018). Positive externalities may exist via information sharing or network effects (e.g., Bayer, Roos, and Topa 2008; Hellerstein, McInerney, and Neumark 2011), peer effects (Manski 1993), or changes in employment-related social norms (Eugster et al. 2017).

We cannot test each type of externality individually, but we take a first step to assess whether there is any evidence of externalities. Similar to the analysis of Crépon et al. (2013), we examine whether the treatment effect is related to the share of income-support claimants assigned to treatment at each employment office in any given month and whether this share affects outcomes of the control group. Our data is limited to treatment and control individuals, precluding an assessment of the program effects on individuals beyond this sample. Nevertheless, given the program's focus on welfare recipients, externalities are most likely to affect other welfare recipients who share similar skills, income levels, and labor market prospects with program participants. Thus, this demographic group constitutes our primary population of interest in analyzing potential program externalities. In addition, given the small size of the treated population relative to the size of the labor market, we assume that the likelihood of general equilibrium effects of the program on the labor market even at the local level is rather low.

For the analysis on externalities, we expand the sample to include jobseekers who were randomized into the program between January 2015 and February 2016 and focus on the program effect on the probability of reporting to IES twelve months after randomization. We select this larger sample in order to obtain greater variation in the proportion of treated individuals at each employment office over time and to enhance statistical power, increasing the likelihood of detecting potential externalities. The sample expansion leads us to focus on the probability of reporting to IES as the main outcome of interest because data on this outcome are available to us over a longer time horizon (as opposed to data on employment and welfare transfers, which are available only up to 2015).[1] We restrict the sample to jobseekers who were randomized from the incoming flow of claimants and define the fraction of job seekers assigned to treatment as the share of treated individuals in the monthly incoming flow of income-support claimants at each employment office.[2] The share of monthly treated individuals varies considerably across employment offices and over time due to regular fluctuations in the incoming flow of claimants and the capacity of the program at the employment office. Appendix Figure A2 presents the overall distribution of the share of treated individuals across employment offices and over time. A variance decomposition analysis indicates that within-office variation accounts for nearly 80% of total variation. The residual

[1] Any effect on employment is expected also to be reflected in the probability of reporting to IES. Thus, the absence of an effect on the probability of reporting to IES is a good indicator of the lack of an effect on employment.

[2] In principle, we could have used the share of treated individuals in the same locality of residence rather than the locality of the employment office visited. However, given that many jobseekers reside in relatively small localities and that the catchment areas of employment offices largely overlap with local labor markets, we prefer to use the latter definition. In addition, we defined the share treated based on the monthly incoming flow of welfare claimants because it is clearly defined unlike the share treated among the welfare stock. Our results are robust to alternatives that include the incoming flow of Unemployment Insurance claimants in the denominator (results not shown).

variation in the monthly share of treated individuals, controlling for employment office and month fixed effects is shown in Appendix Figure A3. This is the variation exploited in the analysis. We show in Appendix Table B2 that within-office fluctuations in the share of treated individuals are not related to jobseekers' characteristics either overall or specifically among members of the treatment or the control group. We also find no evidence that fluctuations in the share of treated income-support claimants are related to changes in the incoming flow of new Unemployment Insurance (UI) claimants (results not shown).[3]

To assess the possibility of program externalities, we estimate the following equation:

$$(3)\ IES\_attendance_{ijt} = \beta_0 + \beta_1\, Treatment_i + \beta_2 Share\_treated_{jt} + \beta_3\, Treatment_i * Share\_treated_{jt} + X_i{}'\varphi + \gamma_j + \delta_t + \varepsilon_{ijt}$$

where, *i* indexes individuals, *j* employment office, and *t* randomization month. $IES\_attendance_{\mathrm{ijt}}$ is an indicator for reporting to the employment office twelve months after randomization; $Treatment_i$ is an indicator that denotes whether individual *i* was assigned to treatment; $Share\_treated_{jt}$ is the share of individuals assigned to treatment from the incoming flow in employment office *j* in month *t*; X_i is a vector of individual characteristics; γ_j are employment office fixed effects; and δ_t are month fixed effects. The coefficients of interest are β_2 and β_3, which provide evidence on whether the share of individuals treated at the same employment office and in the same month is associated with the likelihood of reporting to the employment office twelve months after randomization for individuals in the control (β_2) or the treatment group ($\beta_2 + \beta_3$).

The results are presented in Appendix Table B3. Column (1) reports the effect of treatment on the probability of reporting to the employment office before the share of treated individuals are incorporated into the model (a simple model that does not include β_2 or β_3). The estimate based on this extended sample and alternative model is similar in magnitude to that reported in Table 3, showing that the program reduced the probability of reporting to the employment office twelve months after randomization by 12.5 percentage points (s.e. = 0.011). This is an important result because it shows that this alternative specification and an extended sample yield a similar treatment effect. The treatment

[3] If a higher share of income-support claimants were associated with higher unemployment rates, it would create a spurious relationship between the share treated and either the employment rates or the share of individuals attending the local employment office. We address this concern by regressing the share treated on the incoming flow of new UI claimants at the employment-office-month level while controlling for employment office and month fixed effects. The resulting coefficient is highly insignificant (p-value = 0.96).

coefficient changes little after we control for the share of individuals treated in the same employment office and month as reported in Column (2). In Column (3) we also introduce the interaction term between the share treated and the treatment indicator. Both coefficients are small and not significant, ruling out the possibility of externalities among the treatment and the control group (or at least suggesting that if these externalities exist, they may have positive and negative effects that cancel each other out). As an additional robustness check, we also report in Column (4) the estimates after controlling for the monthly flow of new UI claimants. There is no change in the size or significance of the estimates.

B3. Heterogeneity

We examine heterogeneous treatment effects by individuals' socio-demographic characteristics and pre-program labor-market attachment and welfare dependency. Appendix Figure A4 presents the estimated treatment effects on employment for different subsamples along with their confidence band. Sample sizes for each subsample are reported in square brackets. Appendix Table B4 reports estimates of all outcomes for these subsamples. The program increased employment and reduced welfare dependence for almost all subsamples but had a larger effect (both in absolute terms and relative to the outcome mean of the control group) on some subsamples than on others. For example, the increase in employment for the stock subsample (existing claimants at time of randomization) is 14 percentage points as opposed to an increase of 6 percentage points for the flow subsample (new claimants). Consistent with that, there is a larger reduction in income-support payments for the stock than for the flow subsample. Two additional subsamples highly affected by the program are individuals who have no employment spells in the twenty-four months before randomization into the program and individuals already on welfare during that period.[4] The program boosted the employment rate of the former group by 9 percentage points (relative to a 17% employment rate in the control group) and of the latter group by 11 percentage points (relative to 28% in the control group). Altogether, the different stratifications show that the program had a larger impact on individuals who were less attached to the labor market and did not have recent employment spells.

The program induced a larger increase in employment among women than among men—8 percentage points (29%) versus 6 percentage points (16%), respectively. The program was also highly effective among the Arab population, boosting its employment rates by 14 percentage points (an increase of 62%). Positive

[4] These two subsamples do not completely overlap. Roughly 40% of individuals who had no employment spells during this two-year period received no income support at the time.

effects are also observed among the ultra-Orthodox: the estimate for employment is 0.065 (s.e. = 0.044), a 16% increase, although the sample is too small to reach statistical significance. We do observe a positive and significant impact for this population on the number of months worked during the twelve months after assignment to the program: ultra-Orthodox participants worked, on average, one more month than did non-participants during that time, a 29% increase.

The program is also highly effective among those aged thirty-five or older and among high-school dropouts, increasing the employment rate of both groups by 11 percentage points, a 40% increase. Interestingly, the program has a large impact on individuals who report health limitations when they register at the employment office, i.e., individuals who do not receive disability benefits but declare to the IES upon registration that they have health limitations that prevent them from working. Twelve months after randomization, the employment rate of the treatment group was 14 percentage points higher than the 24% rate of the control group. The program also raised the monthly income (from work and welfare transfers) of the treatment group by NIS 190, which is also reflected in an increase of almost NIS 2,000 (11%) in total income accumulated in the twelve months after randomization. The effect of the program on the employment rate of individuals with no self-reported health limitations was also significant but smaller: 5 percentage points relative to a control mean of 37%.

We also examine the heterogeneous effects of the program by local labor market conditions, categorizing employment offices according to their pre-program unemployment rates in 2012. We classify local areas as low- or high-unemployment using the median unemployment rate (7.5%) across participating employment offices as the threshold, where rates below 7.5% constitute low-unemployment areas and those at or above 7.5% constitute high-unemployment areas.[5] Consistent with previous studies (e.g., Card, Kluve, and Weber 2018), the effect of the program on individuals reporting to offices in high-unemployment areas was larger both in absolute terms and relative to the control mean. Twelve months after randomization, the employment rate of individuals in the control group reporting to offices in low-unemployment areas was 42% while that of individuals in the control group reporting to offices in high-unemployment areas was only 28%. The program leads to a 10 percentage-point (34%) increase in

[5] The median unemployment rate across all catchment areas of employment offices countrywide is identical to that across all catchment areas of employment offices analyzed in the sample. The average unemployment rate in Israel during this period (2012) was 6.9%. The interpretation of the results stratified by local unemployment rate should be viewed with caution because we cannot determine whether the larger program impact in high-unemployment areas traces to specific characteristics of welfare claimants, program administrators, or other conditions in these areas.

employment in high-unemployment areas and a 6 percentage-point (13%) upturn in low-unemployment areas. Similarly, income-support recipiency decreased by 13 percentage points (29%) and 6 percentage points (19%) in high-unemployment and low-unemployment areas, respectively.

B4. Analysis of Selection into Survey and Construction of Weights

We examine whether there is differential selection into the survey by treatment status by estimating a linear probability model of the probability of response as a function of personal characteristics and a treatment dummy, while controlling for the randomization unit. Results reported in Column (1) of Appendix Table B5 suggest that survey response is associated with individual characteristics. Namely, the probability of response is higher for individuals with self-reported health limitations, at least twelve years of schooling, income-support recipiency before random assignment, ultra-Orthodox individuals, and Israeli-born individuals. Nevertheless, treatment status is not associated with the probability of responding to the survey. In Column (2), we test for differential selection of treated individuals by sociodemographic characteristics by also including interactions between all covariates and the treatment dummy. Only two of the twenty-two treatment indicators are statistically significant. Specifically, we find a negative coefficient only for the interaction between treatment and health limitation and a positive coefficient for the interaction between treatment and Arab identity. Overall, despite these small imbalances, we do not observe a consistent pattern of differential selection into the survey based on treatment status.

To analyze the data yielded by the survey respondents, we construct survey weights to account for nonresponse in order to reflect the characteristics of the entire research population. We estimate a logistic regression model that predicts the likelihood of survey response as a function of treatment assignment, individual characteristics, the interaction between the two, and randomization cell fixed effects (the estimates are reported in Appendix Table B6). Each observation is then weighted by the inverse of the predicted response probability, except for observations of individuals surveyed in both survey waves, which we reweight by half of their assigned weight. In Appendix Table B7, we report the results of a balancing test for the reweighted survey sample, which shows that there are no significant differences between the treatment and comparison groups, either in terms of observable individual characteristics or in terms of the time elapsed between random assignment and the survey date.[6] This

[6] There may still be a systematic correlation between unobservables and the propensity to be in the survey in the sample. We cannot entirely rule out this possibility, even though the lack of differences in the observables suggests

table also shows that the average individual characteristics of the survey sample are virtually identical to those of the full sample reported in Table 2. Furthermore, we are able to replicate our main results in administrative outcomes obtained for the full sample using the reweighted survey sample (see Appendix Table B8).

that the presence of a strong correlation in the unobservables is very unlikely, especially if these unobservables are correlated with the observed covariates.

Appendix C - Survey Questions for Assessment of Soft Skills

In addition to standard demographic, employment, and earnings questions, both surveys (Wave 1 and Wave 2) included additional modules meant to measure respondents' soft skills. For logistical reasons that limited survey length, Wave 1 did not include the grit and self-esteem modules. In addition, as detailed below, certain modules used a selected subset of questions to measure specific skills rather than the complete assessment battery.

Job search self-efficacy module (Waves 1 and 2)

I will now read a series of statements. For each statement, please note whether you agree and whether you think it describes you accurately, using the following scale:

1-Strongly agree, 2-Agree, 3-Moderately agree, 4-Disagree, 5-Strongly disagree

1. I am confident in my ability to search for a job.
2. I am confident in my ability to use the internet in order to find a job.
3. I am confident in my ability to write a résumé.
4. I am confident in my ability to pass a job interview.

Source: Israel Employment Service adapted from Saks, Zikic, and Koen (2015).

Work self-efficacy module (Waves 1 and 2)

I will now read a series of statements. For each statement, please note whether you agree and whether you think it describes you accurately, using the following scale:

1-Strongly agree, 2-Agree, 3-Moderately agree, 4-Disagree, 5-Strongly disagree

In my current or future work, I feel I will be able to…

1. Achieve goals that will be assigned.
2. Respect schedules and work deadlines.
3. Learn new work methods.
4. Concentrate all my energy on work.
5. Collaborate with other colleagues.
6. Have good relationships with my superiors.
7. Be courteous to customers.
8. Get to work on time.

Source: Pepe, et al. (2010).

General self-efficacy module (Waves 1 and 2)

I will now read a number of statements. For each statement, please respond on a 5-point scale as to what extent it describes you.

1-Describes me very well, 2-Describes me well, 3-Describes me somewhat, 4-Doesn't describe me well, 5-Doesn't describe me at all

1. I can always manage to solve difficult problems if I try hard enough.
2. If someone opposes me, I can find the means and ways to get what I want.
3. It is easy for me to stick to my aims and accomplish my goals.
4. I can usually handle whatever comes my way.

Source: Schwarzer and Jerusalem (1995).

Grit module (Wave 2)

I will now read a number of statements. For each statement, please respond on a 5-point scale as to what extent it describes you.

1-Describes me very well, 2-Describes me well, 3-Describes me somewhat, 4-Doesn't describe me well, 5-Doesn't describe me at all

1. New ideas and projects sometimes distract me from previous ones.
2. Setbacks don't discourage me.
3. I have been obsessed with a certain idea or project for a short time but later lost interest.
4. I am a hard worker.
5. I often set a goal but later choose to pursue a different one.
6. I have difficulty maintaining my focus on projects that take more than a few months to complete.
7. I finish whatever I begin.
8. I am diligent.

Items 1, 3, 5, and 6 are reverse-scored.

Source: Duckworth (2009).

Self-esteem module (Wave 2)

I will ask you to relate to a number of statements dealing with your general feelings about yourself. For each statement, please respond using the following 4-point scale as to what extent it describes you.

1-Strongly agree, 2-Agree, 3-Disagree, 4-Strongly disagree

1. On the whole, I am satisfied with myself.
2. At times I think I am no good at all.
3. I feel that I have a number of good qualities.
4. I am able to do things as well as most other people.

5. I feel I do not have much to be proud of.
6. I certainly feel useless at times.
7. I feel that I am a person of worth, at least on an equal plane with others.
8. I wish I could have more respect for myself.
9. All in all, I am inclined to feel that I am a failure.
10. I take a positive attitude toward myself.

Items 2, 5, 6, 8, and 9 are reverse-scored.

Source: Rosenberg (1965).

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Appendix Figures and Tables

Figure A1: Characteristics of individuals who have no formal income within two months after random assignment



Notes: The figure reports the relative likelihood of the characteristics of individuals who had no formal income and stopped attending the employment office within two months after random assignment to the program.

Figure A2: Local labor market treatment intensity across individuals



Notes: The figure reports the distribution of the local labor market treatment intensity among individuals in our sample according to their employment office and month of assignment.

Figure A3: Residual variance of labor market treatment intensity



Notes: The figure reports the residual variation in local labor market treatment intensity when controlling for employment office and month fixed effects.

Figure A4: Heterogeneous Employment Effects of the Program



Notes: The figure reports the program's impact on employment across different subpopulations with 95 percent confidence intervals. Number of observations are reported in brackets.

Table A1. Probability to stop reporting to the employment office before the randomization lists are transferred

Treated	0.005	More than 12 years of schooling	0.012
	(0.008)		(0.017)
Female	-0.003	Received income support	-0.074***
	(0.008)	months [-12;0]	(0.011)
Age	-0.002***	Received income support	0.010
	(0.000)	months [-24;-11]	(0.009)
Married	0.001	Received income support	-0.013
	(0.012)	months [-36;-23]	(0.011)
Children	0.001	Months worked	-0.003
	(0.002)	months [-12;0]	(0.002)
Single parent	-0.032***	Months worked	-0.001
	(0.011)	months [-24;-11]	(0.002)
Immigrant	0.002	Months worked	0.001
	(0.011)	months [-36;-23]	(0.002)
Self-reported health limitation	-0.032***	Total earnings	0.000
	(0.007)	months [-12;0]	(0.000)
Arab	-0.012	Total earnings	-0.000
	(0.014)	months [-24;-11]	(0.000)
Ultra Orthodox	-0.004	Total earnings	0.000
	(0.015)	months [-36;-23]	(0.000)
12 years of schooling	0.001	N	6,744
	(0.008)		

Notes: The table reports estimates from a linear probability model. The outcome is an indicator for stop reporting to the employment office before the randomization lists are transferred. Control variables include treatment status, individual's characteristics, and randomization unit fixed effects. * $p < 0.1$, ** $p < 0.05$, *** $p < 0.01$.

Table A2. P-Value adjustment for Multiple hypothesis testing

	Main Results (1)	Original P-Value (2)	Sharpened Q-Value (3)	Romano Wolf P-Value (4)
Reporting to employment office	-0.15*** (0.019)	0.001	0.001	0.001
Employed	0.079*** (0.014)	0.001	0.001	0.001
Income from work (Including zeroes)	161** (65)	0.013	0.008	0.059
Cumulative income from work (Including zeroes)	2026*** (563)	0.001	0.001	0.002
Received Income support	-0.105*** (0.017)	0.001	0.001	0.001
Income support payments (Including zeroes)	-170*** (29)	0.001	0.001	0.001
Cumulative income support (Including zeroes)	-1860*** (278)	0.001	0.001	0.001
Total Income (Including zeroes)	-9 (72)	0.900	0.370	0.941
Total cumulative income (Including zeroes)	167 (663)	0.798	0.363	0.941
Received other welfare payments (disability or UI or other)	-0.009 (0.009)	0.311	0.133	0.624

Notes: The table reports estimation results for sharpened False Discovery Rate (FDR) q-values (Anderson, 2008) in column (3) and adjusted p-values via Romano and Wolf (2005) multiple hypothesis correction in column (4). The first two columns reproduce the estimated treatment effects (reported in column 1 of Table 3) and the unadjusted p-values of the the program effect on participants' outcomes 12 Months after randomization.

Table A3. Income Changes by Employment and Welfare Status 12 Months After Randomization

	Works (1)	Does not work and does not get income support (2)	Gets income support and does not work (3)
Income from work 12 months after randomization	3678	0	0
Income from work 12 months before randomization	1654	1004	638
Difference	2023	-1004	-638
Income support 12 months after randomization	331	0	1667
Income support 12 months before randomization	286	212	740
Difference	44	-212	928
Total Income 12 months after randomization	4008	0	1667
Total Income 12 months before randomization	1940	1216	1378
Difference	2068	-1216	290
Number of observations	1370	1060	618

Notes: The table reports a decomposition of program particpants' income 12 months before and after assignment to treatment according to their employment status 12 months after random assignemnt. Monetary values in real 2016 NIS.

Table A4. Reliability Coefficients of Survey Constructs

Item	Obs (1)	Sign (2)	Item-test correlation (3)	Item-rest correlation (4)	Average interitem covariance (5)	Alpha (6)
Search efficacy					0.612	0.863
I am confident in my abilities to search for a job	2750	+	0.835	0.689	0.623	0.832
I am confident in my ability to use the internet in order to find a job	2725	+	0.816	0.660	0.643	0.844
I am confident in my ability to write a resume	2775	+	0.864	0.738	0.591	0.813
I am confident in my ability to pass a job interview	2701	+	0.861	0.737	0.591	0.813
Work self-efficacy					0.760	0.962
Achieve goals that will be assigned	2729	+	0.875	0.832	0.766	0.958
Respect schedules and working deadlines	2756	+	0.889	0.850	0.761	0.957
Learn new working methods	2719	+	0.862	0.816	0.769	0.959
Concentrate all energy on work	2738	+	0.887	0.848	0.761	0.957
Collaborate with other colleagues	2747	+	0.912	0.882	0.752	0.955
Have good relationships with my superiors	2733	+	0.912	0.881	0.753	0.955
Be courteous to customers	2711	+	0.901	0.867	0.756	0.956
Get to work on time	2748	+	0.886	0.847	0.762	0.957
General self-efficacy					0.609	0.862
I can always manage to solve difficult problems if I try hard enough	2794	+	0.850	0.713	0.604	0.821
If someone opposes me, I can find the means and ways to get what I want	2753	+	0.850	0.717	0.600	0.818
It is easy for me to stick to my aims and accomplish my goals	2785	+	0.831	0.682	0.624	0.833
I can usually handle whatever comes my way	2757	+	0.842	0.704	0.608	0.823

Table A4. (cont.) Reliability Coefficients of Survey Constructs

Item	Obs (1)	Sign (2)	Item-test correlation (3)	Item-rest correlation (4)	Average interitem covariance (5)	Alpha (6)
Grit					0.137	0.559
New ideas and projects sometimes distract me from previous ones (reversed)	831	+	0.429	0.172	0.151	0.555
Setbacks don't discourage me	924	+	0.368	0.100	0.166	0.583
I have been obsessed with a certain idea or project for a short time but later lost interest (reversed)	848	+	0.533	0.299	0.130	0.511
I am a hard worker	889	+	0.453	0.197	0.148	0.549
I often set a goal but later choose to pursue a different one (reversed)	866	+	0.476	0.227	0.140	0.533
I have difficulty maintaining my focus on projects that take more than a few months to complete (reversed)	838	+	0.572	0.356	0.122	0.494
I finish whatever I begin	938	+	0.609	0.388	0.117	0.481
I am diligent	929	+	0.609	0.384	0.120	0.488
Self esteem					0.268	0.785
On the whole, I am satisfied with myself	976	+	0.642	0.492	0.263	0.763
At times I think I am no good at all (reversed)	947	+	0.581	0.432	0.268	0.768
I feel that I have a number of good qualities	955	+	0.637	0.501	0.261	0.761
I am able to do things as well as most other people	950	+	0.647	0.513	0.259	0.758
I feel I do not have much to be proud of (reversed)	872	+	0.410	0.246	0.294	0.790
I certainly feel useless at times (reversed)	877	+	0.612	0.475	0.262	0.762
I feel that I am a person of worth, at least on an equal plane with others	919	+	0.572	0.429	0.270	0.769
I wish I could have more respect for myself (reversed)	879	+	0.476	0.317	0.285	0.782
All in all, I am inclined to feel that I am a failure (reversed)	853	+	0.653	0.532	0.257	0.757
I take a positive attitude toward myself	933	+	0.637	0.503	0.259	0.759

Notes: The table reports the inter-item correlations and Cronbach's alpha for the different soft skills domains included in the survey.

Table A5. Correlations Between Survey Constructs

	Job search self efficacy score (1)	Work self efficacy score (2)	Self efficacy score (3)	Grit score (4)	Self esteem score (5)
Job search self efficacy score	1.000	0.636	0.518	0.364	0.436
Work self efficacy score	0.636	1.000	0.603	0.447	0.477
Self efficacy score	0.518	0.603	1.000	0.464	0.542
Grit score	0.364	0.447	0.464	1.000	0.517
Self esteem score	0.436	0.477	0.542	0.517	1.000

Notes: The table reports the variance-covariance matrix of the standardized aggregate soft skills scores in the survey sample.

Table A6. Program Effect on Search Efficacy

	Full sample (1)	Stock (2)	Flow (3)
I am confident in my abilities to search for a job	0.042	0.153	0.005
	(0.048)	(0.115)	(0.054)
	2750	*746*	*2004*
I am confident in my ability to use the internet in order to find a job	0.069*	0.195**	0.033
	(0.038)	(0.077)	(0.039)
	2725	*735*	*1990*
I am confident in my ability to write a resume	0.054	0.191**	0.019
	(0.041)	(0.084)	(0.044)
	2775	*754*	*2021*
I am confident in my ability to pass a job interview	0.068	0.226**	0.012
	(0.044)	(0.096)	(0.047)
	2701	*736*	*1965*

Notes: The table reports the program effect on participants' standardized job search self-efficacy items. All regressions control for the same set of covariates reported in Table 3 and include fixed effects for the month of survey and the randomization unit. Observations are weighted by survey weights. Number of observations in italics. Standard errors clustered at the randomization unit level in parentheses. * $p < 0.1$, ** $p < 0.05$, *** $p < 0.01$.

Table A7. Program Effect on Work Self-Efficacy

I Feel I can…	Full sample (1)	Stock (2)	Flow (3)
Achieve goals that will be assigned	0.060	0.158*	0.021
	(0.044)	(0.088)	(0.051)
	2729	*734*	*1995*
Respect schedules and working deadlines	0.072*	0.132*	0.042
	(0.042)	(0.068)	(0.049)
	2756	*744*	*2012*
Learn new working methods	0.072*	0.137	0.043
	(0.044)	(0.089)	(0.048)
	2719	*730*	*1989*
Concentrate all energy on work	0.100**	0.091	0.092*
	(0.047)	(0.082)	(0.055)
	2738	*740*	*1998*
Collaborate with other colleagues	0.107**	0.183**	0.067
	(0.045)	(0.086)	(0.051)
	2747	*747*	*2000*
Have good relationships with my superiors	0.073	0.132	0.055
	(0.051)	(0.083)	(0.061)
	2733	*739*	*1994*
Be courteous to customers	0.103**	0.122	0.089
	(0.048)	(0.086)	(0.055)
	2711	*733*	*1978*
Get to work on time	0.094**	0.098	0.086
	(0.047)	(0.083)	(0.054)
	2748	*742*	*2006*

Notes: The table reports the program effect on participants' standardized work self-efficacy items. All regressions control for the same set of covariates reported in Table 3 and include fixed effects for the month of survey and the randomization unit. Observations are weighted by survey weights. Number of observations in italics. Standard errors clustered at the randomization unit level in parentheses. * $p < 0.1$, ** $p < 0.05$, *** $p < 0.01$.

Table A8. Program Effect on Self-Efficacy

	Full sample (1)	Stock (2)	Flow (3)
I can always manage to solve difficult problems if I try hard enough	-0.064	0.074	-0.102*
	(0.051)	(0.105)	(0.056)
	2794	*750*	*2044*
If someone opposes me, I can find the means and ways to get what I want	0.084	0.146*	0.080
	(0.052)	(0.075)	(0.063)
	2753	*737*	*2016*
It is easy for me to stick to my aims and accomplish my goals	-0.029	0.188*	-0.084
	(0.055)	(0.097)	(0.058)
	2785	*746*	*2039*
I can usually handle whatever comes my way	0.030	0.193**	-0.008
	(0.044)	(0.092)	(0.048)
	2757	*738*	*2019*

Notes: The table reports the program effect on participants' standardized general self-efficacy items. All regressions control for the same set of covariates reported in Table 3 and include fixed effects for the month of survey and the randomization unit. Observations are weighted by survey weights. Number of observations in italics. Standard errors clustered at the randomization unit level in parentheses. * $p < 0.1$, ** $p < 0.05$, *** $p < 0.01$.

Table A9. Program Effect on Grit

	Full sample (1)	Stock (2)	Flow (3)
New ideas and projects sometimes distract me from previous ones (reversed)	-0.003 (0.089) *831*	0.048 (0.228) *241*	-0.049 (0.095) *590*
Setbacks don't discourage me	0.098 (0.078) *924*	-0.008 (0.168) *270*	0.143 (0.088) *654*
I have been obsessed with a certain idea or project for a short time but later lost interest (reversed)	-0.128 (0.080) *848*	-0.043 (0.191) *252*	-0.138 (0.096) *596*
I am a hard worker	0.097 (0.083) *889*	0.227 (0.162) *258*	0.062 (0.105) *631*
I often set a goal but later choose to pursue a different one (reversed)	-0.153 (0.093) *866*	0.077 (0.230) *252*	-0.210** (0.101) *614*
I have difficulty maintaining my focus on projects that take more than a few months to complete (reversed)	-0.014 (0.098) *838*	0.275 (0.197) *242*	-0.092 (0.110) *596*
I finish whatever I begin	-0.141 (0.085) *938*	0.228 (0.151) *273*	-0.208** (0.099) *665*
I am diligent	0.056 (0.069) *929*	0.407** (0.156) *272*	-0.027 (0.077) *657*

Notes: The table reports the program effect on participants' standardized grit items. All regressions control for the same set of covariates reported in Table 3 and include fixed effects for the month of survey and the randomization unit. Observations are weighted by survey weights. Number of observations in italics. Standard errors clustered at the randomization unit level in parentheses. * $p < 0.1$, ** $p < 0.05$, *** $p < 0.01$.

Table A10. Program Effect on Self-Esteem

	Full sample	Stock	Flow
	(1)	(2)	(3)
On the whole, I am satisfied with myself	-0.018	0.107	-0.029
	(0.080)	(0.171)	(0.090)
	976	*290*	*686*
At times I think I am no good at all (reversed)	0.046	0.248	-0.019
	(0.078)	(0.163)	(0.090)
	947	*278*	*669*
I feel that I have a number of good qualities	0.093	0.171	0.070
	(0.099)	(0.162)	(0.122)
	955	*283*	*672*
I am able to do things as well as most other people	0.082	0.341*	0.029
	(0.091)	(0.191)	(0.100)
	950	*283*	*667*
I feel I do not have much to be proud of (reversed)	-0.000	0.124	-0.054
	(0.095)	(0.160)	(0.117)
	872	*264*	*608*
I certainly feel useless at times (reversed)	-0.011	0.182	-0.038
	(0.076)	(0.140)	(0.087)
	877	*261*	*616*
I feel that I am a person of worth, at least on an equal plane with others	0.124	0.382**	0.031
	(0.109)	(0.171)	(0.134)
	919	*270*	*649*
I wish I could have more respect for myself (reversed)	0.167**	0.426***	0.102
	(0.079)	(0.143)	(0.093)
	879	*260*	*619*
All in all, I am inclined to feel that I am a failure (reversed)	0.016	0.196	0.008
	(0.080)	(0.194)	(0.089)
	853	*252*	*601*
I take a positive attitude toward myself	0.091	0.094	0.102
	(0.088)	(0.200)	(0.103)
	933	*281*	*652*

Notes: The table reports the program effect on participants' standardized self-esteem items. All regressions control for the same set of covariates reported in Table 3 and include fixed effects for the month of survey and the randomization unit. Observations are weighted by survey weights. Number of observations in italics. Standard errors clustered at the randomization unit level in parentheses. * $p < 0.1$, ** $p < 0.05$, *** $p < 0.01$.

Table B1. Program Effects from Individual Fixed Effects Model:
12 Months After Randomization - 12 Months Before Randomization

	Total months employed (1)	Cumulative income from work (2)	Cumulative income support (3)	Total cumulative income (4)
Post	0.53***	2716***	3711***	6427***
	(0.533)	(756)	(299)	(780)
Treatment * Post	1.003***	2366***	-2591***	-224
	(0.188)	(912)	(386)	(969)
Constant	2.783***	9673***	5541***	15214***
	(0.057)	(261)	(136)	(268)
N	12,302	12,302	12,302	12,302

Notes: The table reports the program effect on participants' cumulative outcomes while controlling for individual fixed effects. The sample includes two observations per individual: one measurement for cumulative outcomes for the year that preceded randomization and the second measurement for cumulative outcomes for the twelve months post-randomization. Monetary values in real 2016 NIS. Standard errors clustered at the randomization unit level in parentheses. * $p < 0.1$, ** $p < 0.05$, *** $p < 0.01$.

Table B2. Balancing Tests by Share Treated in Employment Office

	Female (1)	Age (2)	Married (3)	Number of children (4)	Single parent (5)	Immigrant (6)	Self-reported health limitation (7)	Arab (8)	Ultra Orthodox (9)	Less than 12 years of schooling (10)	12 years of schooling (11)	More than 12 years of schooling (12)
Share treated	0.006	-0.026	-0.028	-0.111	0.030	0.044	-0.066*	-0.031	-0.032	-0.059	0.062	-0.002
	(0.042)	(0.823)	(0.043)	(0.201)	(0.032)	(0.039)	(0.037)	(0.031)	(0.026)	(0.050)	(0.050)	(0.021)
Treated	-0.003	0.264	-0.008	0.128	0.030**	-0.006	-0.001	0.009	-0.006	0.002	0.011	-0.013
	(0.022)	(0.360)	(0.020)	(0.093)	(0.015)	(0.020)	(0.020)	(0.014)	(0.013)	(0.021)	(0.022)	(0.013)
Treated * Share treated	-0.026	-0.625	-0.014	-0.184	-0.041	-0.018	0.060	0.006	0.021	0.004	-0.026	0.021
	(0.053)	(0.944)	(0.055)	(0.236)	(0.039)	(0.050)	(0.049)	(0.041)	(0.036)	(0.058)	(0.059)	(0.029)
N	16,635	16,635	16,635	16,635	16,635	16,635	16,635	16,635	16,635	16,635	16,635	16,635

Notes: The table reports the association between the share of monthly treated individuals in each employment office and individuals' characteristics. Controls include employment office and month fixed effects. Standard errors clustered at the employment-office-month level in parentheses. * $p < 0.1$, ** $p < 0.05$, *** $p < 0.01$.

Table B3. The Relationship Between Share Treated and Attendance at the Employment Office

	Attendance at the employment office 12 months after random assignment			
	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)
Treatment	-0.125***	-0.121***	-0.141***	-0.141***
	(0.011)	(0.011)	(0.022)	(0.022)
Share Treated		-0.052	-0.078	-0.078
		(0.039)	(0.051)	(0.051)
Share Treated X Treatment			0.057	0.057
			(0.059)	(0.058)
Flow of UI claimants (in thousands)				0.001
				(0.019)
N	13,058	13,058	13,058	13,058

Notes: The table reports the probability to report to the employment office 12 months after random assignment as a function of treatment status, the share of monthly treated individuals at the employment office and the interaction between both variables. All regressions control for the same set of covariates reported in Table 3 and include also employment office and month fixed effects. Standard errors clustered at the employment-office-month level in parentheses. * $p < 0.1$, ** $p < 0.05$, *** $p < 0.01$.

Table B4a. Heterogeneous Effects of the Program

	Stock (1)	Flow (2)	No Recent Income Support History (3)	Recent Income Support History (4)	No Recent Employment History (5)	Recent Employment History (6)
Reporting to employment office	-0.2***	-0.134***	-0.127***	-0.17***	-0.206***	-0.115***
	(0.026)	(0.024)	(0.025)	(0.021)	(0.030)	(0.018)
	0.508	*0.360*	*0.314*	*0.464*	*0.491*	*0.304*
Employed	0.138***	0.059***	0.046*	0.112***	0.093***	0.068***
	(0.027)	(0.017)	(0.024)	(0.018)	(0.018)	(0.020)
	0.295	*0.338*	*0.373*	*0.284*	*0.166*	*0.455*
Number of months employed	1.11***	0.782***	0.509***	1.191***	1.102***	0.727***
	(0.238)	(0.142)	(0.185)	(0.163)	(0.155)	(0.176)
	2.964	*3.337*	*3.782*	*2.704*	*1.378*	*4.701*
Income from work (Including zeroes)	377.071***	96.811	51.285	259.203***	121.553*	193.397**
	(116.102)	(79.711)	(110.641)	(85.647)	(69.276)	(95.343)
	1100.516	*1392.310*	*1603.272*	*1052.078*	*612.126*	*1895.182*
Cumulative income from work (Including zeroes)	2917.22***	1760.241**	1305.442	2599.766***	2121.021***	1949.087**
	(974.660)	(685.820)	(966.799)	(705.347)	(628.718)	(799.037)
	10049.708	*12731.909*	*14894.933*	*9349.802*	*4590.745*	*18081.299*
Received Income support	-0.148***	-0.089***	-0.09***	-0.118***	-0.129***	-0.091***
	(0.024)	(0.021)	(0.023)	(0.020)	(0.022)	(0.021)
	0.538	*0.384*	*0.270*	*0.566*	*0.537*	*0.312*
Income support payments (Including zeroes)	-282.4***	-128.431***	-138.395***	-202.724***	-217.213***	-143.504***
	(44.042)	(34.025)	(38.943)	(36.636)	(39.369)	(35.774)
	859.958	*580.539*	*392.579*	*890.352*	*837.237*	*466.647*
Cumulative income support (Including zeroes)	-3002.002***	-1435.743***	-1504.281***	-2224.101***	-2073.753***	-1761.189***
	(375.537)	(329.225)	(356.120)	(344.917)	(449.648)	(353.713)
	11780.957	*8244.457*	*5727.101*	*12323.116*	*11118.897*	*7083.726*
Total Income (Including zeroes)	94.671	-31.621	-87.11	56.478	-95.659	49.893
	(121.580)	(87.780)	(117.751)	(84.294)	(75.653)	(100.255)
	1960.474	*1972.848*	*1995.850*	*1942.429*	*1449.363*	*2361.828*
Total cumulative income (Including zeroes)	-84.782	324.498	-198.838	375.666	47.267	187.898
	(1019.864)	(807.791)	(1096.140)	(774.294)	(739.422)	(910.179)
	21830.664	*20976.367*	*20622.033*	*21672.918*	*15709.643*	*25165.023*
Received other welfare payments (disability or UI or other)	-0.005	-0.011	-0.023*	0.002	-0.008	-0.011
	(0.018)	(0.010)	(0.013)	(0.011)	(0.015)	(0.012)
	0.124	*0.109*	*0.131*	*0.089*	*0.107*	*0.114*
Number of observations	1,498	4,653	3,002	3,149	2,565	3,586

Notes: The table reports the program effect on different sub-populations. Recent income support history refers to individuals who had at least one spell of income support during the two years prior to randomization. Recent employment history refers to individuals who had at least one employment spell during the two years prior to randomization. The Stock subsample refers to income support claimants who were already reporting to the employment office at randomization date. The flow subsample refers to new or re-registering claimants. Controls include the relevant set from the main control list: sex, marital status, age, number of children, schooling level, indicators for new immigrant, single mothers, Arab, ultra-orthodox Jew, self-reported health limitations, vectors for employment, income from work and welfare history, and randomization unit fixed effects. Monetary values in real 2016 NIS. Control group means in italics. Standard errors clustered at the randomization unit level in parentheses. * $p < 0.1$, ** $p < 0.05$, *** $p < 0.01$.

Table B4b. Heterogeneous Effects of the Program

	Men (1)	Women (2)	Jews (3)	Arabs (4)	Ultra Orthodox Jews (5)	Age <35 (6)	Age >=35 (7)
Reporting to employment office	-0.138***	-0.158***	-0.102***	-0.229***	-0.111**	-0.102***	-0.203***
	(0.024)	(0.023)	(0.017)	(0.032)	(0.047)	(0.023)	(0.027)
	0.347	*0.410*	*0.305*	*0.466*	*0.378*	*0.290*	*0.493*
Employed	0.062***	0.083***	0.039**	0.14***	0.065	0.054***	0.109***
	(0.023)	(0.019)	(0.019)	(0.019)	(0.044)	(0.019)	(0.020)
	0.391	*0.289*	*0.432*	*0.227*	*0.351*	*0.380*	*0.276*
Number of months employed	0.729***	0.899***	0.474***	1.462***	0.981**	0.716***	1.026***
	(0.215)	(0.131)	(0.141)	(0.159)	(0.386)	(0.155)	(0.165)
	3.745	*2.950*	*4.461*	*2.048*	*3.401*	*3.775*	*2.705*
Income from work (Including zeroes)	119.303	137.172**	47.625	318.729***	156.105	144.262	166.096*
	(130.904)	(62.308)	(85.633)	(86.227)	(171.893)	(101.781)	(92.010)
	1935.163	*932.438*	*1799.845*	*873.418*	*1123.021*	*1501.937*	*1165.413*
Cumulative income from work (Including zeroes)	1730.61	1854.732***	965.299	3400.894***	2932.931*	2001.274**	2003.713***
	(1136.883)	(490.095)	(705.443)	(772.319)	(1671.310)	(902.638)	(694.702)
	17417.234	*8718.058*	*17060.232*	*7357.457*	*9854.810*	*13923.503*	*10434.754*
Received Income support	-0.086***	-0.115***	-0.071***	-0.16***	-0.039	-0.083***	-0.123***
	(0.023)	(0.020)	(0.017)	(0.028)	(0.043)	(0.022)	(0.025)
	0.342	*0.455*	*0.339*	*0.480*	*0.458*	*0.336*	*0.492*
Income support payments (Including zeroes)	-149.996***	-183.391***	-136.94***	-232.385***	-117.99*	-140.148***	-199.517***
	(33.400)	(39.876)	(31.130)	(44.355)	(64.815)	(41.197)	(40.730)
	478.856	*728.082*	*556.633*	*696.899*	*631.099*	*515.894*	*751.423*
Cumulative income support (Including zeroes)	-1710.018***	-1914.658***	-1704.82***	-2250.202***	-1490.953**	-1559.621***	-2164.527***
	(285.972)	(415.274)	(312.237)	(451.096)	(740.744)	(377.436)	(389.080)
	7152.017	*9975.647*	*8048.302*	*9606.670*	*8614.368*	*7609.141*	*10196.957*
Total Income (Including zeroes)	-30.693	-46.219	-89.315	86.344	38.115	4.114	-33.421
	(131.042)	(69.374)	(84.041)	(103.340)	(172.272)	(118.080)	(87.931)
	2414.020	*1660.521*	*2356.479*	*1570.317*	*1754.119*	*2017.831*	*1916.837*
Total cumulative income (Including zeroes)	20.592	-59.926	-739.52	1150.692	1441.978	441.653	-160.814
	(1117.231)	(611.742)	(732.331)	(954.673)	(1748.272)	(1059.662)	(720.385)
	24569.250	*18693.705*	*25108.535*	*16964.127*	*18469.178*	*21532.643*	*20631.711*
Received other welfare payments (disability or UI or other)	-0.007	-0.006	-0.009	-0.007	-0.008	-0.004	-0.019
	(0.012)	(0.012)	(0.014)	(0.012)	(0.027)	(0.011)	(0.014)
	0.092	*0.124*	*0.136*	*0.086*	*0.104*	*0.079*	*0.149*
Number of observations	2,675	3,476	3,593	2,558	905	3,144	3,007

Notes: The table reports the program effect on different sub-populations. Controls include the relevant set from the main control list: sex, marital status, age, number of children, schooling level, indicators for new immigrant, single mothers, Arab, ultra-orthodox Jew, self-reported health limitations, vectors for employment, income from work and welfare history, and randomization unit fixed effects. Monetary values in real 2016 NIS. Control group means in italics. Standard errors clustered at the randomization unit level in parentheses. * $p < 0.1$, ** $p < 0.05$, *** $p < 0.01$.

Table B4c. Heterogeneous Effects of the Program

	No Self Reported Health Limitations (1)	Self Reported Health Limitations (2)	Single Parents (3)	Less Than 12 Years Of Schooling (4)	12 years of schooling (5)	more than 12 years of schooling (6)	Local Unemplomentrate < 7.5% (7)	Local Unemplomentrate >=7.5% (8)
Reporting to employment office	-0.11***	-0.238***	-0.169***	-0.205***	-0.119***	0.044	-0.118***	-0.173***
	(0.020)	(0.030)	(0.031)	(0.025)	(0.024)	(0.088)	(0.020)	(0.029)
	0.340	*0.479*	*0.425*	*0.467*	*0.328*	*0.173*	*0.306*	*0.438*
Employed	0.049***	0.144***	0.073**	0.105***	0.063***	0.053	0.056**	0.095***
	(0.016)	(0.022)	(0.035)	(0.021)	(0.020)	(0.078)	(0.024)	(0.018)
	0.374	*0.238*	*0.358*	*0.260*	*0.376*	*0.547*	*0.404*	*0.282*
Number of months employed	0.592***	1.502***	0.929***	1.17***	0.716***	-0.09	0.483***	1.122***
	(0.135)	(0.206)	(0.282)	(0.158)	(0.160)	(0.729)	(0.161)	(0.155)
	3.763	*2.216*	*3.534*	*2.508*	*3.711*	*6.113*	*4.214*	*2.638*
Income from work (Including zeroes)	31.544	433.296***	203.857	192.277**	166.58**	-284.022	68.902	206.718***
	(86.427)	(103.874)	(135.130)	(82.856)	(83.121)	(867.399)	(103.350)	(79.532)
	1550.668	*896.815*	*1213.928*	*1023.876*	*1413.231*	*3617.648*	*1730.466*	*1082.507*
Cumulative income from worl (Including zeroes)	961.157	4392.611***	2693.079**	2703.32***	1780.159***	-3666.443	1063.807	2472.658***
	(755.428)	(774.413)	(1083.990)	(635.666)	(689.910)	(8500.292)	(788.431)	(725.886)
	14440.458	*7624.496*	*11180.235*	*9079.598*	*12985.942*	*35009.859*	*16379.834*	*9515.750*
Received Income support	-0.085***	-0.153***	-0.084**	-0.144***	-0.084***	0.091	-0.063***	-0.135***
	(0.019)	(0.023)	(0.035)	(0.022)	(0.020)	(0.088)	(0.019)	(0.026)
	0.387	*0.456*	*0.455*	*0.492*	*0.355*	*0.167*	*0.323*	*0.467*
Income support payments (Including zeroes)	-140.091***	-242.835***	-158.917*	-213.227***	-158.266***	176.674	-135.423***	-193.341***
	(35.238)	(39.000)	(86.292)	(39.188)	(35.609)	(163.567)	(38.528)	(43.362)
	604.770	*670.603*	*894.952*	*754.050*	*540.825*	*267.320*	*517.392*	*699.210*
Cumulative income support (Including zeroes)	-1574.414***	-2456.417***	-2270.409**	-2447.09***	-1634.693***	1525.121	-1735.869***	-1942.05***
	(343.518)	(423.796)	(956.902)	(360.131)	(344.355)	(1579.506)	(388.762)	(400.936)
	8547.170	*9393.063*	*12170.298*	*10221.449*	*7938.194*	*4389.525*	*7661.726*	*9598.610*
Total Income (Including zeroes)	-108.548	190.46*	44.94	-20.95	8.314	-107.348	-66.521	13.377
	(94.300)	(110.324)	(141.113)	(87.714)	(85.536)	(860.100)	(96.869)	(98.527)
	2155.438	*1567.418*	*2108.880*	*1777.926*	*1954.056*	*3884.968*	*2247.858*	*1781.717*
Total cumulative income (Including zeroes)	-613.258	1936.194**	422.67	256.23	145.466	-2141.323	-672.061	530.608
	(839.169)	(862.647)	(1378.514)	(715.668)	(748.589)	(8251.045)	(800.840)	(932.220)
	22987.629	*17017.559*	*23350.533*	*19301.047*	*20924.137*	*39399.383*	*24041.559*	*19114.359*
Received other welfare payments (disability or UI or other)	-0.011	-0.008	-0.031	-0.015	-0.005	-0.094**	-0.021	-0.001
	(0.009)	(0.019)	(0.031)	(0.013)	(0.012)	(0.048)	(0.017)	(0.009)
	0.079	*0.183*	*0.283*	*0.114*	*0.111*	*0.087*	*0.139*	*0.092*
Number of observations	4,066	2,085	1,258	2,625	3,215	311	2,736	3,415

Notes: The table reports the program effect on different sub-populations. Controls include the relevant set from the main control list: sex, marital status, age, number of children, schooling level, indicators for new immigrant, single mothers, Arab, ultra-orthodox Jew, self-reported health limitations, vectors for employment, income from work and welfare history, and randomization unit fixed effects. Monetary values in real 2016 NIS. Control group means in italics. Standard errors clustered at the randomization unit level in parentheses. * p < 0.1, ** p < 0.05, *** p < 0.01.

Table B5. Selection into the Survey

	(1)	(2)
Treated	0.014	-0.084
	(0.015)	(0.073)
Female	0.014	0.005
	(0.018)	(0.025)
Age	0.001	0.001
	(0.001)	(0.001)
Married	0.038*	0.041
	(0.020)	(0.027)
Children	0.003	-0.001
	(0.005)	(0.006)
Single parent	0.026	0.013
	(0.019)	(0.029)
Immigrant	-0.063***	-0.032
	(0.021)	(0.027)
Self-reported health limitation	0.049***	0.087***
	(0.015)	(0.023)
Arab	0.016	-0.026
	(0.021)	(0.024)
Ultra Orthodox	0.084***	0.076*
	(0.026)	(0.044)
12 years of schooling	0.095***	0.082***
	(0.016)	(0.022)
More than 12 years of schooling	0.194***	0.145***
	(0.031)	(0.048)
Received income support months [-12;0]	-0.001	0.008
	(0.019)	(0.025)
Received income support months [-24;-11]	0.042**	0.000
	(0.020)	(0.034)
Received income support months [-36;-23]	-0.016	0.004
	(0.020)	(0.033)
Months worked months [-12;0]	-0.001	-0.003
	(0.004)	(0.006)
Months worked months [-24;-11]	0.002	0.004
	(0.003)	(0.005)
Months worked months [-36;-23]	0.006*	0.009**
	(0.003)	(0.004)
Total earnings months [-12;-0]	-0.001	0.000
	(0.008)	(0.011)
Total earnings months [-24;-11]	0.005	0.004
	(0.007)	(0.009)
Total earnings months [-36;-23]	-0.001	-0.001
	(0.005)	(0.007)
First survey pop. sample	0.350***	0.333***
	(0.021)	(0.016)

	(1)	(2)
Treated * Female		0.023
		(0.035)
Treated * Age		0.001
		(0.002)
Treated * Married		-0.014
		(0.040)
Treated * Children		0.009
		(0.008)
Treated * Single parent		0.017
		(0.043)
Treated * Immigrant		-0.053
		(0.036)
Treated * Self-reported health limitation		-0.075**
		(0.030)
Treated * Arab		0.095***
		(0.035)
Treated * Ultra Orthodox		0.017
		(0.051)
Treated * 12 years of schooling		0.024
		(0.029)
Treated * More than 12 years of schooling		0.086
		(0.065)
Treated * Received income support months [-12;0]		-0.011
		(0.037)
Treated * Received income support months [-24;-11]		0.080
		(0.050)
Treated * Received income support months [-36;-23]		-0.033
		(0.044)
Treated * Months worked months [-12;0]		0.002
		(0.007)
Treated * Months worked months [-24;-11]		-0.003
		(0.008)
Treated * Months worked months [-36;-23]		-0.005
		(0.005)
Treated * Total earnings months [-12;0]		-0.001
		(0.016)
Treated * Total earnings months [-24;-11]		0.001
		(0.016)
Treated * Total earnings months [-36;-23]		0.002
		(0.010)
Treated * First survey pop. sample		0.045
		(0.028)
Treated * Claimant type		-0.006
		(0.034)
F-Stat for joint significance		4.875
P-value		<0.001
N	6,713	6,713

Notes: The table reports the probability of survey response as a function of personal characteristics and program assignment, conditional on randomization unit fixed effects.

The F-stat is for a test of joint significance of treatment and all interactions with treatment.

Standard errors clustered at the randomization unit level in parentheses. * p < 0.1, ** p < 0.05, *** p < 0.01.

Table B6. Estimation of Survey Weights - Probability of Inclusion into Survey Sample

Treated	0.066	Treated * Female	0.086
	(0.295)		(0.123)
Female	0.029	Treated * Age	-0.001
	(0.090)		(0.007)
Age	0.004	Treated * Married	-0.070
	(0.005)		(0.170)
Married	0.179	Treated * Children	0.034
	(0.123)		(0.036)
Children	-0.001	Treated * Single parent	0.104
	(0.025)		(0.182)
Single parent	0.020	Treated * Immigrant	-0.177
	(0.135)		(0.156)
Immigrant	-0.153	Treated * Self-reported health limitation	-0.276**
	(0.116)		(0.123)
Self-reported health limitation	0.313***	Treated * Arab	0.413***
	(0.090)		(0.151)
Arab	-0.084	Treated * Ultra Orthodox	0.089
	(0.126)		(0.199)
Ultra Orthodox	0.328**	Treated * 12 years of schooling	0.134
	(0.158)		(0.121)
12 years of schooling	0.279***	Treated * More than 12 years of schooling	0.257
	(0.088)		(0.266)
More than 12 years of schooling	0.646***	Treated * Received income support months [-12;0]	-0.179
	(0.194)		(0.132)
Received income support months [-12;0]	0.199*	Treated * Received income support months [-24;-11]	0.402**
	(0.103)		(0.188)
Received income support months [-24;-11]	-0.028	Treated * Received income support months [-36;-23]	-0.188
	(0.141)		(0.186)
Received income support months [-36;-23]	-0.013	Treated * Months worked months [-12;0]	0.016
	(0.139)		(0.029)
Months worked months [-12;0]	-0.016	Treated * Months worked months [-24;-11]	-0.030
	(0.021)		(0.030)
Months worked months [-24;-11]	0.027	Treated * Months worked months [-36;-23]	-0.014
	(0.022)		(0.025)
Months worked months [-36;-23]	0.030*	Treated * Total earnings months [-12;0]	-0.019
	(0.018)		(0.064)
Total earnings months [-12;-0]	0.013	Treated * Total earnings months [-24;-11]	0.032
	(0.046)		(0.057)
Total earnings months [-24;-11]	0.004	Treated * Total earnings months [-36;-23]	0.001
	(0.040)		(0.044)
Total earnings months [-36;-23]	-0.010	Constant	-0.951**
	(0.031)		(0.406)
		N	6,117

Notes: The table reports the estimates of a logistic regression that estimates likelihood of survey response as a function of personal characteristics and program assignment, conditional on randomization unit fixed effects. Standard errors clustered at the randomization unit level in parentheses. * $p < 0.1$, ** $p < 0.05$, *** $p < 0.01$.

Table B7. Descriptive Statistics and Balancing Tests - Survey Sample

	treated (1)	T-C (2)		treated (1)	T-C (2)
Female	0.54	-0.024	Months worked	2.84	-0.061
		(0.023)	months [-12;0]		(0.199)
Age	34.56	0.129	Months worked	3.96	0.098
		(0.492)	months [-24;-11]		(0.242)
Married	0.47	0.007	Months worked	4.31	0.223
		(0.020)	months [-36;-23]		(0.254)
Children	2.00	0.014	Total earnings	9846	150
		(0.092)	months [-12;0]		(696)
Single parent	0.22	0.002	Total earnings	16341	1220
		(0.021)	months [-24;-11]		(1294)
Immigrant	0.20	-0.018	Total earnings	18284	1100
		(0.019)	months [-36;-23]		(1536)
Self-reported health limitation	0.36	0.009	Total income support	6106	140
		(0.021)	months [-12;0]		(424)
Arab	0.35	-0.002	Total income support	4040	250
		(0.014)	months [-24;-11]		(389)
Ultra Orthodox	0.19	0.025*	Total income support	3263	90
		(0.013)	months [-36;-23]		(318)
Less than 12 years of schooling	0.39	-0.033	Months since random assignm	13.60	-0.464
		(0.024)			(0.000)
12 years of schooling	0.56	0.032	F-Stat for joint significance	0.693	
		(0.024)			
			P-value	0.835	
More than 12 years of schooling	0.05	0			
		(0.010)	Number of observations	1,702	3,044
Received income support months [-12;0]	0.52	-0.015 (0.028)			
Received income support months [-24;-11]	0.28	0.003 (0.021)			
Received income support months [-36;-23]	0.24	0.004 (0.019)			

Notes: The table reports the average characteristics of treatment group (column 1) alongside the estimated difference with the control group, conditional on randomization unit fixed effects (column 2). The sample is restricted on survey respondent. The reported F statistic tests the joint significance of all covariants in a linear probability model that predicts treatment status conditional on randomization unit fixed effects. Observations are weighted by survey weights. Monetary values in real 2016 NIS. Standard errors clustered at the randomization unit level in parentheses. * $p < 0.1$, ** $p < 0.05$, *** $p < 0.01$.

Table B8. Main Results Based on Survey Sample

	Full sample	Stock	Flow
	(1)	(2)	(3)
Reporting to employment office	-0.157***	-0.241***	-0.122***
	(0.024)	(0.039)	(0.027)
	0.409	*0.566*	*0.378*
Employment	0.089***	0.109**	0.074***
	(0.023)	(0.050)	(0.025)
	0.355	*0.306*	*0.365*
Income from work	119	290	38
(Including zeroes)	(107)	(190)	(131)
	1,477	*1,121*	*1,546*
Cumulative income from work	1510	1296	1365
(Including zeroes)	(973)	(1543)	(1200)
	13,501	*10,160*	*14,157*
Received Income support	-0.083***	-0.117***	-0.066**
	(0.023)	(0.041)	(0.029)
	0.423	*0.550*	*0.398*
Income support payments	-131***	-277***	-76
(Including zeroes)	(43)	(68)	(52)
	621	*875*	*572*
Cumulative income support	-1364***	-2862***	-757
(Including zeroes)	(469)	(647)	(583)
	8,776	*12,020*	*8,139*
Total Income	-12	13	-38
(Including zeroes)	(111)	(204)	(135)
	2,098	*1,995*	*2,118*
Total cumulative income	146	-1566	608
(Including zeroes)	(1037)	(1547)	(1268)
	22,276	*22,180*	*22,295*
Received other welfare payments	-0.003	-0.012	-0.004
(disability or UI or other)	(0.013)	(0.028)	(0.015)
	0.109	*0.112*	*0.108*
N	3064	840	2224

Notes: The table reports the program effect on participants' outcomes. The sample is restricted to survey respondents. All regressions control for the same set of covariates reported in Table 3 and include fixed effects for the month of survey and the randomization unit. Observations are weighted by survey weights. Monetary values in real 2016 NIS. Control group means in italics. Standard errors clustered at the randomization unit level in parentheses. * p < 0.1, ** p < 0.05, *** p < 0.01.