

# Online Appendix


## Unilateral Divorce, Assortative Mating, and Household Income Inequality

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
# A Supplementary Figures and Tables

Figure A1: Association between Husband's and Wife's Incomes and Education Levels Before and After the Introduction of Unilateral Divorce




*Note:* The graphs are binned scatter plots of the husband's versus the wife's incomes or years of education among newlyweds who got married before (in blue circles) and after (in red diamonds) the introduction of unilateral divorce in the census data. The  $x$ -axis ( $y$ -axis) comprises 40 equal-sized bins of the husband's (wife's) income level, income rank, log income, or years of education. All panels control for age and race dummies for each spouse, property division regime dummies, year fixed effects, and state fixed effects.

Figure A2: Household Income Inequality (75/25 Percentile Ratio) Among Newlyweds for Each Treated State and Its Synthetic Control State



*Note:* The graphs present the 75/25 percentile ratio of household income among newly married couples from the census data. Each graph corresponds to a treated state that adopted unilateral divorce in the 1970s without altering property division laws and its synthetic control (a combination of states without any divorce law changes in the study period). Due to space limitations, graphs for treated states that revised property division laws and graphs using other inequality measures are omitted from the paper, but available upon request.

Figure A3: Spousal Correlation in Income Among Newlyweds for Each Treated State and Its Synthetic Control State



*Note:* The graphs present the spousal correlation in income level among newly married couples from the census data. Each graph corresponds to a treated state that adopted unilateral divorce in the 1970s without altering property division laws and its synthetic control (a combination of states without any divorce law changes in the study period). Due to space limitations, graphs for treated states that revised property division laws and graphs using other correlation coefficients are omitted from the paper, but available upon request.

Table A1: Education Information Availability in NCHS Marriage Data

| State                | Unilateral Divorce | NCHS            | State          | Unilateral Divorce | NCHS      |
|----------------------|--------------------|-----------------|----------------|--------------------|-----------|
| Alabama              | 1971               | 1988            | Montana        | 1973               | 1977–1988 |
| Alaska               | 1935               | NA              | Nebraska       | 1972               | 1970–1988 |
| Arizona              | 1973               | NA              | Nevada         | 1967               | NA        |
| Arkansas             |                    | NA              | New Hampshire  | 1971               | 1970–1988 |
| California           | 1970               | 1970–1988       | New Jersey     |                    | NA        |
| Colorado             | 1972               | NA              | New Mexico     | 1933               | NA        |
| Connecticut          | 1973               | 1981–1988       | New York       |                    | NA        |
| Delaware             | 1968               | NA              | North Carolina |                    | 1970–1988 |
| District of Columbia |                    | NA              | North Dakota   | 1971               | NA        |
| Florida              | 1971               | NA              | Ohio           |                    | NA        |
| Georgia              | 1973               | NA              | Oklahoma       | 1953               | NA        |
| Hawaii               | 1972               | 1970–1988       | Oregon         | 1971               | NA        |
| Idaho                | 1971               | NA              | Pennsylvania   |                    | NA        |
| Illinois             |                    | 1970–1988       | Rhode Island   | 1975               | 1970–1988 |
| Indiana              | 1973               | 1988            | South Carolina |                    | 1971      |
| Iowa                 | 1970               | 1971–1978, 1985 | South Dakota   | 1985               | NA        |
| Kansas               | 1969               | 1972–1976       | Tennessee      |                    | 1970–1988 |
| Kentucky             | 1972               | 1984–1988       | Texas          | 1970               | NA        |
| Louisiana            |                    | 1970–1988       | Utah           | 1987               | 1970–1988 |
| Maine                | 1973               | 1978–1988       | Vermont        |                    | 1970–1988 |
| Maryland             |                    | NA              | Virginia       |                    | 1970–1988 |
| Massachusetts        | 1975               | NA              | Washington     | 1973               | NA        |
| Michigan             | 1972               | NA              | West Virginia  |                    | NA        |
| Minnesota            | 1974               | 1970–1975       | Wisconsin      | 1978               | 1978–1988 |
| Mississippi          |                    | 1979–1988       | Wyoming        | 1977               | 1970–1988 |
| Missouri             |                    | 1975–1988       |                |                    |           |

Note: The table shows the availability of education information in the NCHS marriage records. The table also shows the years in which unilateral divorce was introduced from Gruber (2004) for comparison.

Table A2: Effect of Unilateral Divorce on Household Income Inequality  
Among Newly Married Couples: Synthetic Control Weights

| Variables                                     | Household Income Inequality |                      |                     |                       |                        |
|---|-----------------------------|----------------------|---------------------|-----------------------|------------------------|
|   | Gini                        | P75/P25              | P90/P10             | GE(0)                 | GE(1)                  |
| <i>Panel A: Community Property</i>            |                             |                      |                     |                       |                        |
| Arizona                                       | 0.0109<br>(0.00949)         | -0.0191<br>(0.0730)  | 0.925**<br>(0.394)  | 0.0162<br>(0.0143)    | 0.0158<br>(0.0133)     |
| California                                    | 0.0357***<br>(0.00881)      | 0.290***<br>(0.0736) | 1.409***<br>(0.432) | 0.0620***<br>(0.0154) | 0.0578**<br>(0.0244)   |
| Texas   | 0.00160<br>(0.00917)        | 0.0719<br>(0.0687)   | 0.241<br>(0.389)    | 0.0127<br>(0.0139)    | 0.00139<br>(0.0129)    |
| Washington                                    | 0.0373***<br>(0.0101)       | 0.315***<br>(0.0714) | 1.539***<br>(0.421) | 0.0581***<br>(0.0163) | 0.0474**<br>(0.0155)   |
| Idaho*  | -0.00149<br>(0.0190)        | 0.248<br>(0.218)     | 0.683<br>(1.074)    | -0.00566<br>(0.0289)  | -0.0296<br>(0.0223)    |
| Nevada <sup>†</sup>                           | 0.00760<br>(0.0180)         | 0.114<br>(0.185)     | 0.921<br>(0.895)    | 0.0378<br>(0.0298)    | 0.0104<br>(0.0281)     |
| <i>Panel B: Equitable Division</i>            |                             |                      |                     |                       |                        |
| Hawaii  | 0.0529***<br>(0.0103)       | 0.529***<br>(0.0736) | 2.126***<br>(0.423) | 0.0937***<br>(0.0160) | 0.0597***<br>(0.0140)  |
| Indiana                                       | 0.00972<br>(0.0103)         | 0.108<br>(0.0735)    | 1.050**<br>(0.413)  | 0.0258<br>(0.0162)    | 0.0197<br>(0.0171)     |
| Iowa  | 0.0129<br>(0.0101)          | 0.197**<br>(0.0730)  | 0.975**<br>(0.428)  | 0.0181<br>(0.0145)    | 0.0245<br>(0.0208)     |
| Michigan                                      | 0.0275**<br>(0.0101)        | 0.250***<br>(0.0714) | 1.280***<br>(0.409) | 0.0372**<br>(0.0154)  | 0.0336**<br>(0.0150)   |
| Minnesota                                     | 0.0319***<br>(0.00979)      | 0.299***<br>(0.0708) | 1.223**<br>(0.419)  | 0.0390**<br>(0.0146)  | 0.0394**<br>(0.0132)   |
| Wisconsin                                     | 0.0362***<br>(0.0103)       | 0.205**<br>(0.0729)  | 1.427***<br>(0.417) | 0.0579***<br>(0.0164) | 0.0460**<br>(0.0158)   |
| North Dakota*                                 | 0.0514***<br>(0.0121)       | 0.385**<br>(0.166)   | 2.262***<br>(0.730) | 0.0997***<br>(0.0188) | 0.0729***<br>(0.0202)  |
| Wyoming*                                      | -0.0377**<br>(0.0158)       | 0.0557<br>(0.168)    | 0.0302<br>(0.830)   | -0.0448*<br>(0.0237)  | -0.0551***<br>(0.0182) |
| Delaware <sup>†</sup>                         | 0.00668<br>(0.0101)         | 0.240<br>(0.165)     | 0.832<br>(0.627)    | 0.0147<br>(0.0154)    | 0.00126<br>(0.0180)    |
| Kansas <sup>†</sup>                           | 0.00546<br>(0.00618)        | -0.0251<br>(0.0808)  | 0.493*<br>(0.243)   | 0.0129<br>(0.00939)   | 0.00914<br>(0.0110)    |
| <i>Panel C: Title-based Property Division</i> |                             |                      |                     |                       |                        |
| Alabama                                       | -0.00285                    | 0.155**              | 0.325               | -0.00940              | -0.00553               |

|              |           |          |          |           |           |
|--------------|-----------|----------|----------|-----------|-----------|
|              | (0.00681) | (0.0632) | (0.352)  | (0.0129)  | (0.00732) |
| Georgia      | 0.00487   | 0.164*** | 0.204    | 0.0156    | 0.00709   |
|              | (0.00791) | (0.0527) | (0.382)  | (0.0138)  | (0.0108)  |
| Rhode Island | 0.0561    | 0.298*** | 1.757*** | 0.0474*** | 0.0514*** |
|              | (0.0468)  | (0.0528) | (0.354)  | (0.00820) | (0.00431) |

*Panel D: Changed from Community Property to Equitable Division*

|               |          |          |         |          |           |
|---------------|----------|----------|---------|----------|-----------|
| Colorado      | 0.0279   | -0.0850  | 0.659   | 0.0525   | 0.0561    |
|               | (0.0305) | (0.229)  | (0.964) | (0.0448) | (0.0494)  |
| Connecticut   | 0.0399   | -0.0388  | 1.586   | 0.0777   | 0.0624    |
|               | (0.0307) | (0.232)  | (0.992) | (0.0448) | (0.0477)  |
| Florida       | 0.0163   | 0.149*   | 0.905*  | 0.0332*  | 0.0270    |
|               | (0.0104) | (0.0681) | (0.429) | (0.0161) | (0.0167)  |
| Kentucky      | 0.0359   | 0.186    | 0.771   | 0.0311*  | 0.0158*** |
|               | (0.0466) | (0.171)  | (1.885) | (0.0170) | (0.00400) |
| Maine         | 0.0595** | 0.0462   | 2.150** | 0.0989** | 0.0760**  |
|               | (0.0236) | (0.234)  | (0.958) | (0.0380) | (0.0294)  |
| Massachusetts | 0.0373   | 0.168    | 1.609   | 0.0745   | 0.0492    |
|               | (0.0273) | (0.210)  | (0.972) | (0.0433) | (0.0370)  |
| Nebraska      | 0.0160   | -0.199   | 0.685   | 0.0636   | 0.110*    |
|               | (0.0284) | (0.233)  | (0.976) | (0.0429) | (0.0600)  |
| New Hampshire | 0.0324   | 0.0266   | 1.043   | 0.0616   | 0.0806    |
|               | (0.0299) | (0.231)  | (0.993) | (0.0438) | (0.0586)  |
| Oregon        | 0.0387   | 0.0865   | 1.120   | 0.0647   | 0.0466    |
|               | (0.0266) | (0.217)  | (0.959) | (0.0410) | (0.0312)  |
| Montana*      | 0.0310   | 0.475*   | 1.728   | 0.0496   | 0.0338    |
|               | (0.0256) | (0.267)  | (1.132) | (0.0399) | (0.0353)  |

Note: The table presents the estimate of  $\alpha_1$  in Equation 4 separately for each treated state, as listed in the first column. The dependent variable is a measure of household income inequality among couples who married in the current year or within the previous year in the census data. Panels A, B, and C are for states that did not change their property division laws; these panels include state and year fixed effects in all regressions. Panel D is for states that changed their property division laws, and thus include *Post* and *Treat* dummies and property division dummies. Standard errors are clustered at the state level. Note that in a few cases where a treated state's synthetic control comprises just one untreated state, the results are derived from a basic difference-in-differences approach without additional controls or clustering of standard errors. Treated states with \* introduced unilateral divorce in the 1970s but lack data in the 1970 census. Treated states with † introduced unilateral divorce in the 1960s. For these treated states, I use all states that did not implement any divorce law changes from 1960–1980 as the control group, without applying any synthetic control weights. For all other treated states, their synthetic control states are constructed based on Equation 3. Robust standard errors in parentheses: \*\*\* $p < 0.01$ , \*\* $p < 0.05$ , \* $p < 0.1$ .

Table A3: Effect of Unilateral Divorce on Assortative Mating  
Among Newly Married Couples: Synthetic Control Weights

| Variables                                     | Correlation between Husband's and Wife's |                       |                      |                       |
|---|--|-----------------------|----------------------|-----------------------|
|   | Income Level                             | Income Rank           | Log Income           | Education             |
| <i>Panel A: Community Property</i>            |  |                       |                      |                       |
| Arizona                                       | 0.0576***<br>(0.0158)                    | -0.00335<br>(0.0301)  | 0.143***<br>(0.0358) | 0.0773<br>(0.0701)    |
| California                                    | 0.0494**<br>(0.0169)                     | 0.0752**<br>(0.0280)  | 0.0702*<br>(0.0351)  | 0.103***<br>(0.0164)  |
| Texas   | 0.0635***<br>(0.0108)                    | 0.00665<br>(0.0246)   | 0.0246<br>(0.0323)   | 0.0249<br>(0.0147)    |
| Washington                                    | 0.0541***<br>(0.0150)                    | 0.0630**<br>(0.0212)  | 0.0634*<br>(0.0347)  | 0.0475**<br>(0.0161)  |
| Idaho*  | -0.0293<br>(0.0462)                      | 0.0235<br>(0.0399)    | 0.0316<br>(0.0389)   | 0.159***<br>(0.0309)  |
| Nevada <sup>†</sup>                           | 0.0179<br>(0.0688)                       | 0.0782*<br>(0.0427)   | -0.0752<br>(0.0631)  | 0.0118<br>(0.0499)    |
| <i>Panel B: Equitable Division</i>            |  |                       |                      |                       |
| Hawaii  | 0.150***<br>(0.0193)                     | 0.218***<br>(0.0208)  | 0.125***<br>(0.0325) | 0.120*<br>(0.0649)    |
| Indiana                                       | 0.0542**<br>(0.0190)                     | 0.0277<br>(0.0207)    | 0.0750*<br>(0.0351)  | 0.0504**<br>(0.0201)  |
| Iowa  | 0.0576**<br>(0.0195)                     | 0.0818***<br>(0.0209) | 0.107***<br>(0.0267) | 0.0783***<br>(0.0193) |
| Michigan                                      | 0.0505**<br>(0.0199)                     | 0.0281<br>(0.0218)    | 0.0357<br>(0.0323)   | 0.0295<br>(0.0169)    |
| Minnesota                                     | 0.0667***<br>(0.0199)                    | 0.0451<br>(0.0281)    | 0.126***<br>(0.0350) | 0.0602***<br>(0.0175) |
| Wisconsin                                     | 0.0984***<br>(0.0180)                    | 0.0869***<br>(0.0212) | 0.168***<br>(0.0138) | 0.155***<br>(0.0169)  |
| North Dakota*                                 | 0.152***<br>(0.0500)                     | 0.154***<br>(0.0356)  | 0.123*<br>(0.0633)   | 0.0595<br>(0.0360)    |
| Wyoming*                                      | -0.0453<br>(0.0336)                      | 0.00675<br>(0.0319)   | 0.00970<br>(0.0269)  | 0.164***<br>(0.0216)  |
| Delaware <sup>†</sup>                         | 0.0750<br>(0.0603)                       | 0.0196<br>(0.0191)    | -0.101<br>(0.0587)   | 0.113***<br>(0.0358)  |
| Kansas <sup>†</sup>                           | -0.114**<br>(0.0432)                     | 0.0470<br>(0.0284)    | 0.0891**<br>(0.0388) | -0.00168<br>(0.0219)  |
| <i>Panel C: Title-based Property Division</i> |  |                       |                      |                       |
| Alabama                                       | 0.0850***                                | 0.0417                | -0.0169              | -0.0481***            |



|              |           |          |           |           |
|--------------|-----------|----------|-----------|-----------|
|              | (0.0152)  | (0.0277) | (0.0323)  | (0.00385) |
| Georgia      | 0.0606*** | 0.0741   | 0.127***  | 0.0216    |
|              | (0.0119)  | (0.0956) | (0.00858) | (0.0154)  |
| Rhode Island | 0.191***  | 0.125*** | 0.128***  | 0.168***  |
|              | (0.0144)  | (0.0322) | (0.0370)  | (0.0247)  |

*Panel D: Changed from Community Property to Equitable Division*

|               |          |          |          |          |
|---------------|----------|----------|----------|----------|
| Colorado      | 0.178*** | 0.00347  | 0.178**  | 0.0371   |
|               | (0.0313) | (0.0994) | (0.0652) | (0.0286) |
| Connecticut   | 0.153*** | 0.146**  | 0.167**  | 0.00892  |
|               | (0.0459) | (0.0479) | (0.0747) | (0.0380) |
| Florida       | 0.00790  | 0.0385   | 0.0373   | 0.0297   |
|               | (0.0204) | (0.0215) | (0.0369) | (0.0624) |
| Kentucky      | 0.128**  | 0.128    | 0.0844   | 0.0685   |
|               | (0.0336) | (0.0995) | (0.0623) | (0.0390) |
| Maine         | 0.0552   | 0.128    | 0.0911   | 0.0625   |
|               | (0.0425) | (0.0957) | (0.0618) | (0.0367) |
| Massachusetts | 0.192*** | 0.169**  | 0.227**  | 0.0945** |
|               | (0.0474) | (0.0692) | (0.0750) | (0.0325) |
| Nebraska      | 0.160*** | -0.0319  | 0.0528   | 0.126*   |
|               | (0.0413) | (0.102)  | (0.120)  | (0.0625) |
| New Hampshire | 0.0894   | -0.123   | 0.117*   | 0.126*   |
|               | (0.0525) | (0.106)  | (0.0646) | (0.0625) |
| Oregon        | 0.112**  | 0.174**  | 0.112    | 0.108**  |
|               | (0.0460) | (0.0713) | (0.118)  | (0.0425) |
| Montana*      | 0.160**  | 0.154**  | 0.0608   | 0.0807*  |
|               | (0.0557) | (0.0636) | (0.0556) | (0.0440) |

Note: The table presents the estimate of  $\alpha_1$  in Equation 4 separately for each treated state, as listed in the first column. The dependent variable is a correlation coefficients between spouses in income or education levels among couples who married in the current year or within the previous year in the census data. Panels A, B, and C are for states that did not change their property division laws; these panels include state and year fixed effects in all regressions. Panel D is for states that changed their property division laws, and thus include *Post* and *Treat* dummies and property division dummies. Standard errors are clustered at the state level. Note that in a few cases where a treated state's synthetic control comprises just one untreated state, the results are derived from a basic difference-in-differences approach without additional controls or clustering of standard errors. Treated states with \* introduced unilateral divorce in the 1970s but lack data in the 1970 census. Treated states with † introduced unilateral divorce in the 1960s. For these treated states, I use all states that did not implement any divorce law changes from 1960–1980 as the control group, without applying any synthetic control weights. For all other treated states, their synthetic control states are constructed based on Equation 3. Robust standard errors in parentheses: \*\*\* $p < 0.01$ , \*\* $p < 0.05$ , \* $p < 0.1$ .

Table A4: Effect of Unilateral Divorce on Assortative Mating Among Newly Married Couples: Heterogeneity Across Couples

| <i>Panel A: By Type of Marriage</i> |                     |                      |                      |                     |
|-------------------------------------|---------------------|----------------------|----------------------|---------------------|
| Variables                           | First Marriage      |                      | Remarried            |                     |
|                                     | Income Cor.<br>(1)  | Educ. Cor.<br>(2)    | Income Cor.<br>(3)   | Educ. Cor.<br>(4)   |
| UD                                  | 0.0351*<br>(0.0200) | 0.0351**<br>(0.0152) | 0.0880**<br>(0.0421) | 0.0357<br>(0.0306)  |
| Mean of dep. var.                   | 0.148               | 0.602                | 0.182                | 0.491               |
| <i>Panel B: By Age</i>              |                     |                      |                      |                     |
| Variables                           | Young               |                      | Old                  |                     |
|                                     | Income Cor.<br>(1)  | Educ. Cor.<br>(2)    | Income Cor.<br>(3)   | Educ. Cor.<br>(4)   |
| UD                                  | 0.0323*<br>(0.0164) | 0.0361**<br>(0.0164) | 0.0891**<br>(0.0403) | 0.0676*<br>(0.0341) |
| Mean of dep. var.                   | 0.146               | 0.584                | 0.158                | 0.551               |

Note: The dependent variable is the correlation coefficient between the husband's and wife's income level or years of education among couples who got married in the current year or within the previous year in the census data, by state and year. "First Marriage" refers to couples where both spouses were in their first marriage. "Remarried" refers to couples where one spouse had been married previously. "Young" refers to couples where the wife was under 31 (90th percentile for newly married women's age) and the husband was under 36 (90th percentile for newly married men's age); all other couples are classified as "Old." All regressions control for the average age and average age squared of husbands and wives, the share of white individuals among husbands and wives, dummy variables for property division regimes, year fixed effects, and state fixed effects. Standard errors are clustered at the state level. Robust standard errors in parentheses: \*\*\* $p < 0.01$ , \*\* $p < 0.05$ , \* $p < 0.1$ . The table additionally includes the mean of the dependent variable prior to the introduction of unilateral divorce.

Table A5: Effect of Unilateral Divorce on Assortative Mating Among Newly Married Couples:  
NCHS Marriage Data vs. 5% Censuses

|   | Correlation between Husband's and Wife's Education |                    |  |                      |                                 |                        |
|---|--|--------------------|--|----------------------|---------------------------------|------------------------|
|   | All Couples  |                    | At Least One Spouse<br>in 1st Marriage |                      | Both Spouses<br>in 1st Marriage |                        |
|   | 1970–88<br>(1)                                     | 1970–80<br>(2)     | 1970–88<br>(3)                         | 1970–80<br>(4)       | 1970–88<br>(5)                  | 1970–80<br>(6)         |
| <i>Panel A: NCHS Marriage Data</i>            |  |                    |  |                      |                                 |                        |
| UD  | 0.0107<br>(0.00766)                                | 0.0176<br>(0.0115) | 0.00894*<br>(0.00480)                  | 0.0135*<br>(0.00651) | 0.0184***<br>(0.00610)          | 0.0248***<br>(0.00835) |
| Observations                                  | 278  | 158                | 278                                    | 158                  | 278                             | 158                    |
| Mean of dep. var.                             | 0.576  | 0.582              | 0.605                                  | 0.607                | 0.641                           | 0.639                  |
| <i>Panel B: 5% Censuses for 1970 and 1980</i> |  |                    |  |                      |                                 |                        |
| UD  |  |                    |  | 0.0322<br>(0.0239)   |                                 | 0.0400<br>(0.0371)     |
| Observations                                  |  |                    |  | 28                   |                                 | 28                     |
| Mean of dep. var.                             |  |                    |  | 0.588                |                                 | 0.601                  |

Note: Panel A presents the estimates of the effect of unilateral divorce on spousal correlation in education ( $\alpha_1$  in Equation 1) using NCHS marriage data from 16 states (1970–1988). This includes 8 states that introduced unilateral divorce during the study period (California, Hawaii, Minnesota, Nebraska, New Hampshire, Rhode Island, Utah, and Wyoming) and 8 states that did not (Illinois, Louisiana, Mississippi, Missouri, North Carolina, Tennessee, Vermont, and Virginia). Columns 1–2 cover all newly married couples; columns 3–4 focus on those in which at least one spouse was in his or her first marriage; columns 5–6 focus on newly married couples in which both spouses were in their first marriage. Columns 2, 4, and 6 restrict the sample to the period from 1970–1980, aligning the study period with the 5% census data. Panel B uses the 5% census data for 1970 and 1980 (excluding the 1960 census for comparability with NCHS), based on the 16 states in the NCHS dataset. Note that the census sample does not include newly married couples in which both spouses were remarried because the data only provide information on the age of first marriage. All regressions control for the average age and average age squared of husbands and wives, the share of white individuals among husbands and wives, dummy variables for property division regimes, year fixed effects, and state fixed effects. Standard errors are clustered at the state level. Robust standard errors in parentheses: \*\*\* $p < 0.01$ , \*\* $p < 0.05$ , \* $p < 0.1$ . The table additionally includes the mean of the dependent variable prior to the introduction of unilateral divorce.

Table A6: Effect of Unilateral Divorce on Education

| Variables         | Years of Education |                    | College             |                     | Some College        |                     |
|-------------------|--------------------|--------------------|---------------------|---------------------|---------------------|---------------------|
|                   | Men<br>(1)         | Women<br>(2)       | Men<br>(3)          | Women<br>(4)        | Men<br>(5)          | Women<br>(6)        |
| UD                | -0.164<br>(0.101)  | -0.125<br>(0.0779) | -0.0024<br>(0.0031) | -0.0039<br>(0.0042) | -0.0022<br>(0.0057) | -0.0019<br>(0.0066) |
| Observations      | 3,136,256          | 3,316,584          | 3,136,256           | 3,316,584           | 3,136,256           | 3,316,584           |
| Mean of dep. var. | 11.44              | 11.40              | 0.116               | 0.0818              | 0.258               | 0.212               |

Note: The sample includes individuals aged from 15–34 from the 5% census data. The dependent variable is the years of education, an indicator for having a college degree, or an indicator for having some college education without a degree. All regressions control for dummy variables for age, race, and property division regimes, as well as year fixed effects and state fixed effects. Standard errors are clustered at the state level. Robust standard errors in parentheses: \*\*\* $p < 0.01$ , \*\* $p < 0.05$ , \* $p < 0.1$ . The table additionally includes the mean of the dependent variable prior to the introduction of unilateral divorce.

Table A7: Effect of Unilateral Divorce on Household Income Inequality  
Among Newly Married Couples: States Reformed in the 1970s

| Variables   | Household Income Inequality (Newlyweds) |                      |                      |                      |                     |
|---|---|----------------------|----------------------|----------------------|---------------------|
|   | Gini<br>(1)                             | P75/P25<br>(2)       | P90/P10<br>(3)       | GE(0)<br>(4)         | GE(1)<br>(5)        |
| <i>Panel A: Two-Way Fixed Effects</i>                                       |   |                      |                      |                      |                     |
| UD  | 0.0215**<br>(0.0104)                    | 0.175**<br>(0.0787)  | 0.944**<br>(0.370)   | 0.0331**<br>(0.0143) | 0.0270*<br>(0.0149) |
| Observations  | 105                                     | 105                  | 105                  | 105                  | 105                 |
| <i>Panel B: DID<sub>M</sub> (de Chaisemartin and D'Haultfoeuille, 2020)</i> |   |                      |                      |                      |                     |
| DID <sub>M</sub>  | 0.0293*<br>(0.0167)                     | 0.1748*<br>(0.1031)  | 1.1761**<br>(0.5299) | 0.0451**<br>(0.0226) | 0.0413*<br>(0.0227) |
| Observations  | 31                                      | 31                   | 31                   | 31                   | 31                  |
| Switchers   | 22                                      | 22                   | 22                   | 22                   | 22                  |
| <i>Panel C: Synthetic Control Weights</i>                                   |   |                      |                      |                      |                     |
| Post × Treat  | 0.0194**<br>(0.00869)                   | 0.232***<br>(0.0744) | 0.963**<br>(0.403)   | 0.0297**<br>(0.0136) | 0.0239*<br>(0.0121) |
| Observations  | 997                                     | 1,059                | 1,027                | 1,059                | 1,059               |
| Mean of dep. var.   | 0.316                                   | 2.215                | 5.016                | 0.204                | 0.173               |

Note: The sample includes treated states that introduced unilateral divorce in the 1970s and states that did not implement any divorce law changes from 1960–1980 as the control group (including Louisiana, Mississippi, North Carolina, Ohio, South Carolina, South Dakota, Tennessee, Utah, Vermont, Virginia, and West Virginia). The dependent variable is a measure of household income inequality among couples who got married in the current year or within the previous year in the census data, including the Gini coefficient, percentile ratios, and the Generalized entropy (GE) measures, by state and year. Panel A presents the TWFE estimates ( $\alpha_1$  in Equation 1). Panel B presents the estimates using the DID<sub>M</sub> estimator proposed by [De Chaisemartin and d'Haultfoeuille \(2020\)](#). Panel C presents the difference-in-differences estimates using the synthetic control weights, outlined in Equation 4; the estimates are obtained by pooling all treated states and their corresponding synthetic controls. All regressions control for the average age and average age squared of both husbands and wives, the share of white individuals among husbands and wives, dummy variables for property division regimes, year fixed effects, and state fixed effects. Standard errors are clustered at the state level. Robust standard errors in parentheses: \*\*\* $p < 0.01$ , \*\* $p < 0.05$ , \* $p < 0.1$ . The table additionally includes the mean of the dependent variable prior to the introduction of unilateral divorce.

Table A8: Effect of Unilateral Divorce on Assortative Mating  
Among Newly Married Couples: States Reformed in the 1970s

| Variables   | Correlation between Husband's and Wife's |                       |                       |                       |
|---|--|-----------------------|-----------------------|-----------------------|
|   | Income Level<br>(1)                      | Income Rank<br>(2)    | Log Income<br>(3)     | Education<br>(4)      |
| <i>Panel A: Two-Way Fixed Effects</i>                                       |  |                       |                       |                       |
| UD  | 0.0808***<br>(0.0198)                    | 0.0795***<br>(0.0196) | 0.0618**<br>(0.0286)  | 0.0517***<br>(0.0186) |
| Observations  | 105                                      | 105                   | 105                   | 105                   |
| <i>Panel B: DID<sub>M</sub> (de Chaisemartin and D'Haultfoeuille, 2020)</i> |  |                       |                       |                       |
| DID <sub>M</sub>  | 0.1395***<br>(0.0464)                    | 0.0833<br>(0.0536)    | 0.0667<br>(0.0604)    | 0.0529*<br>(0.0319)   |
| Observations  | 31                                       | 31                    | 31                    | 31                    |
| Switchers   | 22                                       | 22                    | 22                    | 22                    |
| <i>Panel C: Synthetic Control Weights</i>                                   |  |                       |                       |                       |
| Post × Treat  | 0.0767***<br>(0.0200)                    | 0.0652***<br>(0.0152) | 0.0680***<br>(0.0218) | 0.0588***<br>(0.0137) |
| Observations  | 1,041                                    | 869                   | 995                   | 905                   |
| Mean of dep. var.   | 0.152                                    | 0.131                 | 0.171                 | 0.586                 |

Note: The sample includes treated states that introduced unilateral divorce in the 1970s and states that did not implement any divorce law changes from 1960–1980 as the control group (including Louisiana, Mississippi, North Carolina, Ohio, South Carolina, South Dakota, Tennessee, Utah, Vermont, Virginia, and West Virginia). The dependent variable is the correlation coefficient between the husband's and wife's income level, income rank, log income, or years of education among couples who got married in the current year or within the previous year in the census data, by state and year. Panel A presents the TWFE estimates ( $\alpha_1$  in Equation 1). Panel B presents the estimates using the DID<sub>M</sub> estimator proposed by [De Chaisemartin and d'Haultfoeuille \(2020\)](#). Panel C presents the difference-in-differences estimates using the synthetic control weights, outlined in Equation 4; the estimates are obtained by pooling all treated states and their corresponding synthetic controls. All regressions control for the average age and average age squared of both husbands and wives, the share of white individuals among husbands and wives, dummy variables for property division regimes, year fixed effects, and state fixed effects. Standard errors are clustered at the state level. Robust standard errors in parentheses: \*\*\* $p < 0.01$ , \*\* $p < 0.05$ , \* $p < 0.1$ . The table additionally includes the mean of the dependent variable prior to the introduction of unilateral divorce.

Table A9: Differences in the Coding of Unilateral Divorce  
between Gruber (2004) and Friedberg (1998)

| State                | Gruber | Friedberg | State          | Gruber | Friedberg |
|----------------------|--------|-----------|----------------|--------|-----------|
| Alabama              | 1971   |           | Montana        | 1973   | 1975      |
| Alaska               | 1935   |           | Nebraska       | 1972   |           |
| Arizona              | 1973   |           | Nevada         | 1967   | 1973      |
| Arkansas             | No     |           | New Hampshire  | 1971   |           |
| California           | 1970   |           | New Jersey     | No     |           |
| Colorado             | 1972   | 1971      | New Mexico     | 1933   | 1973      |
| Connecticut          | 1973   |           | New York       | No     |           |
| Delaware             | 1968   | No        | North Carolina | No     |           |
| District of Columbia | No     |           | North Dakota   | 1971   |           |
| Florida              | 1971   |           | Ohio           | No     |           |
| Georgia              | 1973   |           | Oklahoma       | 1953   |           |
| Hawaii               | 1972   | 1973      | Oregon         | 1971   | 1973      |
| Idaho                | 1971   |           | Pennsylvania   | No     |           |
| Illinois             | No     |           | Rhode Island   | 1975   | 1976      |
| Indiana              | 1973   |           | South Carolina | No     |           |
| Iowa                 | 1970   |           | South Dakota   | 1985   |           |
| Kansas               | 1969   |           | Tennessee      | No     |           |
| Kentucky             | 1972   |           | Texas          | 1970   | 1974      |
| Louisiana            | No     |           | Utah           | 1987   | No        |
| Maine                | 1973   |           | Vermont        | No     |           |
| Maryland             | No     |           | Virginia       | No     |           |
| Massachusetts        | 1975   |           | Washington     | 1973   |           |
| Michigan             | 1972   |           | West Virginia  | No     |           |
| Minnesota            | 1974   |           | Wisconsin      | 1978   | No        |
| Mississippi          | No     |           | Wyoming        | 1977   |           |
| Missouri             | No     |           |                |        |           |

Note: The table presents the years in which unilateral divorce laws were introduced, sourced from [Gruber \(2004\)](#) and [Friedberg \(1998\)](#). If the coding of the reform year for a state is consistent between these two sources, the corresponding cell under “Friedberg” is left blank.

Table A10: Effect of Unilateral Divorce on Household Income Inequality Among Newly Married Couples: Friedberg (1998)'s Coding

| Variables   | Household Income Inequality (Newlyweds) |                      |                     |                      |                     |
|---|---|----------------------|---------------------|----------------------|---------------------|
|   | Gini<br>(1)                             | P75/P25<br>(2)       | P90/P10<br>(3)      | GE(0)<br>(4)         | GE(1)<br>(5)        |
| <i>Panel A: Two-Way Fixed Effects</i>                                       |   |                      |                     |                      |                     |
| UD  | 0.0090<br>(0.0063)                      | 0.135**<br>(0.0541)  | 0.338<br>(0.259)    | 0.0097<br>(0.0091)   | 0.0101<br>(0.0080)  |
| Observations  | 146                                     | 146                  | 146                 | 146                  | 146                 |
| <i>Panel B: DID<sub>M</sub> (de Chaisemartin and D'Haultfoeuille, 2020)</i> |   |                      |                     |                      |                     |
| DID <sub>M</sub>  | 0.0027<br>(0.0103)                      | 0.0808<br>(0.0838)   | 0.1541<br>(0.4035)  | 0.0012<br>(0.0147)   | 0.0034<br>(0.0134)  |
| Observations  | 42                                      | 42                   | 42                  | 42                   | 42                  |
| Switchers   | 24                                      | 24                   | 24                  | 24                   | 24                  |
| <i>Panel C: Synthetic Control Weights</i>                                   |   |                      |                     |                      |                     |
| Post × Treat  | 0.0223**<br>(0.00867)                   | 0.231***<br>(0.0675) | 1.070***<br>(0.384) | 0.0304**<br>(0.0123) | 0.0256*<br>(0.0128) |
| Observations  | 848                                     | 1,004                | 972                 | 1,001                | 1,022               |
| Mean of dep. var.   | 0.316                                   | 2.209                | 4.993               | 0.203                | 0.173               |

Note: This table corresponds to Table 3, but the coding of unilateral divorce is from [Friedberg \(1998\)](#). The dependent variable is a measure of household income inequality among couples who got married in the current year or within the previous year in the census data, including the Gini coefficient, percentile ratios, and the Generalized entropy (GE) measures, by state and year. Panel A presents the TWFE estimates ( $\alpha_1$  in Equation 1). Panel B presents the estimates using the DID<sub>M</sub> estimator proposed by [De Chaisemartin and d'Haultfoeuille \(2020\)](#). Panel C presents the difference-in-differences estimates using the synthetic control weights, outlined in Equation 4; the estimates are obtained by pooling all treated states and their corresponding synthetic controls. All regressions control for the average age and average age squared of both husbands and wives, the share of white individuals among husbands and wives, dummy variables for property division regimes, year fixed effects, and state fixed effects. Standard errors are clustered at the state level. Robust standard errors in parentheses: \*\*\* $p < 0.01$ , \*\* $p < 0.05$ , \* $p < 0.1$ . The table additionally includes the mean of the dependent variable prior to the introduction of unilateral divorce.



Table A11: Effect of Unilateral Divorce on Assortative Mating  
Among Newly Married Couples: Friedberg (1998)'s Coding

| Variables   | Correlation between Husband's and Wife's |                       |                      |                      |
|---|--|-----------------------|----------------------|----------------------|
|   | Income Level<br>(1)                      | Income Rank<br>(2)    | Log Income<br>(3)    | Education<br>(4)     |
| <i>Panel A: Two-Way Fixed Effects</i>                                       |  |                       |                      |                      |
| UD  | 0.0493***<br>(0.0155)                    | 0.0509***<br>(0.0176) | 0.0446**<br>(0.0198) | 0.0116<br>(0.0150)   |
| Observations  | 146                                      | 146                   | 146                  | 146                  |
| <i>Panel B: DID<sub>M</sub> (de Chaisemartin and D'Haultfoeuille, 2020)</i> |  |                       |                      |                      |
| DID <sub>M</sub>  | 0.0512*<br>(0.0303)                      | 0.0482<br>(0.0369)    | 0.0377<br>(0.0311)   | 0.0064<br>(0.0229)   |
| Observations  | 42                                       | 42                    | 42                   | 42                   |
| Switchers   | 24                                       | 24                    | 24                   | 24                   |
| <i>Panel C: Synthetic Control Weights</i>                                   |  |                       |                      |                      |
| Post × Treat  | 0.0517**<br>(0.0240)                     | 0.0601***<br>(0.0141) | 0.0425<br>(0.0258)   | 0.0323**<br>(0.0146) |
| Observations  | 989                                      | 814                   | 912                  | 850                  |
| Mean of dep. var.   | 0.160                                    | 0.137                 | 0.179                | 0.588                |

Note: This table corresponds to Table 4, but the coding of unilateral divorce is from [Friedberg \(1998\)](#). The dependent variable is the correlation coefficient between the husband's and wife's income level, income rank, log income, or years of education among couples who got married in the current year or within the previous year in the census data, by state and year. Panel A presents the TWFE estimates ( $\alpha_1$  in Equation 1). Panel B presents the estimates using the DID<sub>M</sub> estimator proposed by [De Chaisemartin and d'Haultfoeuille \(2020\)](#). Panel C presents the difference-in-differences estimates using the synthetic control weights, outlined in Equation 4; the estimates are obtained by pooling all treated states and their corresponding synthetic controls. All regressions control for the average age and average age squared of both husbands and wives, the share of white individuals among husbands and wives, dummy variables for property division regimes, year fixed effects, and state fixed effects. Standard errors are clustered at the state level. Robust standard errors in parentheses: \*\*\* $p < 0.01$ , \*\* $p < 0.05$ , \* $p < 0.1$ . The table additionally includes the mean of the dependent variable prior to the introduction of unilateral divorce.

## B Unilateral Divorce and Assortative Mating:

### Individual-level Analysis

Following the literature, I also examine the effect of unilateral divorce on assortative mating by estimating the following equation for newly married couple  $i$  in state  $s$  and year  $t$ :

$$y_{ist}^w = \beta_0 + \beta_1 y_{ist}^h + \beta_2 y_{ist}^h \times UD_{st} + \beta_3 UD_{st} + \beta_4 E_{st} + \beta_5 C_{st} \quad (6)$$
$$+ Z_{ist}\pi + \chi_s + \xi_t + \epsilon_{ist},$$

where  $y_{ist}^w$  is the income or education level of the wife in couple  $i$  from state  $s$  in year  $t$  ( $t = 1960, 1970, 1980$ ) and  $y_{ist}^h$  is the same outcome for the husband.  $UD_{st}$  is an indicator equal to one if newly married couples from state  $s$  in year  $t$  were exposed to unilateral divorce at the time of their marriage.  $E_{st}$  and  $C_{st}$  are indicators for equitable property division and community property, respectively. The vector  $Z_{ist}$  includes age and race dummies for each spouse.  $\chi_s$  and  $\xi_t$  denote state and year fixed effects, respectively. The coefficient of interest is  $\beta_2$ .

Additionally, I consider the following model by adding the interaction between state fixed effects and  $y_{ist}^h$  and the interaction between year fixed effects and  $y_{ist}^h$ , allowing the association of spousal incomes or education levels to vary by state and year:

$$y_{ist}^w = \beta_0 + \beta_2 y_{ist}^h \times UD_{st} + \beta_3 UD_{st} + \beta_4 E_{st} + \beta_5 C_{st} \quad (7)$$
$$+ Z_{ist}\pi + \gamma_s y_{ist}^h + \delta_t y_{ist}^h + \chi_s + \xi_t + \epsilon_{ist}.$$

Again, the coefficient of interest is  $\beta_2$ .

However,  $\beta_2$  may not reflect the effect of unilateral divorce on marital sorting. This is because the coefficient represents changes in the covariance between the husband's and wife's incomes divided by the variance of the husband's income. In other words,  $\beta_2$  may also capture changes in the relative variance of incomes between spouses (Gihleb and Lang, 2020). Therefore, it is also necessary to conduct a reverse regression with the husband's outcome as the dependent variable.

Table B1 presents the results. In Panel A, the dependent variable is the wife's income level,

income rank, log income, or years of education. Columns 1, 3, 5, and 7 present the estimates of  $\beta_1$  and  $\beta_2$  in Equation 6. Columns 2, 4, 6, and 8 present the estimates of  $\beta_2$  in Equation 7. All columns control for age and race dummies for each spouse, property division regime dummies, year fixed effects, and state fixed effects. All standard errors are clustered at the state level.

Column 1 of Panel A in Table B1 shows that each additional dollar earned by a husband before marriage was associated with a 0.07-dollar increase in his wife's pre-marital income. Under unilateral divorce, the association increased by 0.02 dollar, approximately a 30% increase, compared with under mutual consent divorce. Column 2, which allows for state- and year-specific spousal associations, shows an average of 0.03 for the estimates of  $\gamma_s y_{ist}^h$  and  $\delta_t y_{ist}^h$  before the introduction of unilateral divorce. Thus, the estimated effect is around 40%, although the estimate is statistically insignificant. These results are largely in line with the TWFE analysis using the state-level regression, which suggests a 28% increase (Table 4 Panel A column 1).

In the remaining columns of Panel A in Table B1, the findings are mostly consistent with those from the state-level analysis. Columns 3 and 4 show that unilateral divorce increased assortative mating in income rank by 53% and 79%, respectively. These are higher than the 31% increase found in the state-level analysis (Table 4 Panel A column 2). Columns 5 and 6 suggest that unilateral divorce increased assortative mating in log income by 17% and 33%, respectively, aligning more closely with the 21% increase found in the state-level analysis (Table 4 Panel A column 3). Lastly, columns 7 and 8 suggest a 8% increase in educational sorting, which is comparable to the 7% increase found in the state-level analysis (Table 4 Panel A column 4).

Panel B of Table B1 shows the results of the reverse regression of Equation 6, with the husband's outcome as the dependent variable. Regarding income sorting, the estimated effects of unilateral divorce are similar across both specifications of the reverse regression. These findings also align with those presented in Panel A. However, for the effect of unilateral divorce on educational sorting, column 7 suggests a negative effect, whereas column 8 suggests a 6% increase in educational sorting under unilateral divorce.

In summary, the results from the main regression and the reverse regression, especially those

from the basic model (Equation 6) are mostly comparable, with the exception of findings related to education. The estimates from Equation 7 are mostly not statistically significant. Furthermore, the findings from the individual-level regressions are consistent with the main findings from the state-level regressions for most of the assortative mating measures. In the main analysis of the paper, I mainly use the state-level regressions, as the estimates from the individual-level regressions may not exclusively represent spousal correlation.

Table B1: Effect of Unilateral Divorce on Assortative Mating for Newly Married Couples: Individual-Level Analysis

| <i>Panel A</i>                 |                        |                        |                        |                       |                        |                     |                        |
|--------------------------------|------------------------|------------------------|------------------------|-----------------------|------------------------|---------------------|------------------------|
| Wife's Outcome ( $y^w$ )       |                        |                        |                        |                       |                        |                     |                        |
| Variables                      | Income Level           | Income Rank            | Log Income             | Education             | Income Level           | Income Rank         | Log Income             |
|                                | (1)                    | (2)                    | (3)                    | (4)                   | (5)                    | (6)                 | (7)                    |
|                                | (8)                    |                        |                        |                       |                        |                     |                        |
| $y^b$                          | 0.0673***<br>(0.00582) | 0.0832***<br>(0.00882) | 0.156***<br>(0.00668)  | 0.447***<br>(0.00894) |                        |                     |                        |
| $y^b \times UD$                | 0.0203**<br>(0.00821)  | 0.0121<br>(0.0118)     | 0.0442***<br>(0.0101)  | 0.0318**<br>(0.0131)  | 0.0264***<br>(0.00704) | 0.0253<br>(0.0223)  | 0.0388**<br>(0.0154)   |
| Mean corr.                     | N/A                    | 0.0300                 | N/A                    | 0.0404                | N/A                    | 0.0764              | N/A                    |
|                                |                        |                        |                        |                       |                        |                     | 0.222                  |
| <i>Panel B</i>                 |                        |                        |                        |                       |                        |                     |                        |
| Husband's Outcome ( $y^b$ )    |                        |                        |                        |                       |                        |                     |                        |
| Variables                      | Income Level           | Income Rank            | Log Income             | Education             | Income Level           | Income Rank         | Log Income             |
|                                | (1)                    | (2)                    | (3)                    | (4)                   | (5)                    | (6)                 | (7)                    |
|                                | (8)                    |                        |                        |                       |                        |                     |                        |
| $y^w$                          | 0.162***<br>(0.00899)  | 0.0694***<br>(0.00629) | 0.0728***<br>(0.00391) | 0.653***<br>(0.00768) |                        |                     |                        |
| $y^w \times UD$                | 0.0402**<br>(0.0165)   | 0.0246<br>(0.0269)     | 0.0374***<br>(0.00880) | 0.0179<br>(0.0134)    | 0.0181***<br>(0.00533) | 0.00888<br>(0.0117) | -0.0407***<br>(0.0150) |
| Mean corr.                     | N/A                    | 0.0756                 | N/A                    | 0.0346                | N/A                    | 0.0374              | N/A                    |
|                                |                        |                        |                        |                       |                        |                     | 0.324                  |
| Observations                   | 261,222                | 261,222                | 261,222                | 261,222               | 202,334                | 202,334             | 261,222                |
| Year- and state-specific corr. | No                     | Yes                    | No                     | Yes                   | No                     | Yes                 | No                     |
|                                |                        |                        |                        |                       |                        |                     | Yes                    |
|                                |                        |                        |                        |                       |                        |                     | Yes                    |

Note: The sample includes individuals who got married in the current year or within the previous year in the census data. In Panel A, The dependent variable is the wife's income level, income rank, log income, or years of education. Columns 1, 3, 5, and 7 present the estimates of  $\beta_1$  and  $\beta_2$  in Equation 6. Columns 2, 4, 6, and 8 present the estimates of  $\beta_2$  in Equation 7. All columns control for age and race dummies for each spouse, property division regime dummies, year fixed effects, and state fixed effects. Panel B presents the estimates of the reversed regressions, with the husband's outcome as the dependent variable. Standard errors are clustered at the state level. Robust standard errors in parentheses: \*\*\* $p < 0.01$ , \*\* $p < 0.05$ , \* $p < 0.1$ .

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