The Intergenerational Transmission of Poverty and Public Assistance – Evidence from the Earned Income Tax Credit

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Online Appendix

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Appendix

Figure A1. Residual for Average Annual EITC Exposure between Birth and Age 15, by Year of Birth



Source: 1968-2017 waves of the Panel Study of Income Dynamics (PSID).

Notes: The residuals are collected by treating maximum EITC benefit as the dependent variable and using the set of independent variables from our main model to predict EITC exposure, then collect the residuals. The sample consists of heads and spouses born between 1967 and 1992. All monetary variables are in 2017 dollars. All results are weighted by average childhood PSID weights.

Appendix Table 1. State EITC generosity by year, expressed as a share of the federal EITC

Tax Year	CA[a]	CO	CT	DC	DE**	HI**	IL	IN	IA	KS	LA	ME**	MD	MA	MI	MN[e]	MO**	MT	NE	NJ	NM
1986																					
1987																					
1988																					
1989																					
1990									0.05**												
1991									0.065**							0.10					
1992									0.065**							0.10					
1993									0.065**							0.15					
1994									0.065**							0.15					
1995									0.065**							0.15					
1996									0.065**							0.15					
1997									0.065**					0.10		0.15					
1998									0.065**	0.10			0.10	0.10		0.25					
1999		0.085							0.065**	0.10			0.10	0.10		0.25					
2000		0.10		0.10			0.05**		0.065**	0.10		0.05	0.15	0.10		0.25				0.10	
2001		0.10		0.25			0.05**		0.065**	0.10		0.05	0.16	0.15		0.33				0.15	
2002		0		0.25			0.05**		0.065**	0.15		0.05	0.16	0.15		0.33				0.18	
2003		0		0.25			0.05	0.06	0.065**	0.15		0.05	0.18	0.15		0.33			0.08	0.20	
2004		0		0.25			0.05	0.06	0.065**	0.15		0.05	0.20	0.15		0.33			0.08	0.20	
2005		0		0.35			0.05	0.06	0.065**	0.15		0.05	0.20	0.15		0.33			0.08	0.20	
2006		0		0.35	0.20		0.05	0.06	0.065**	0.15		0.05	0.20	0.15		0.33			0.08	0.20	
2007		0		0.35	0.20		0.05	0.06	0.07	0.17		0.05	0.20	0.15		0.33			0.08	0.20	0.08
2008		0		0.40	0.20		0.05	0.06	0.07	0.17	0.035	0.05	0.25	0.15	0.10	0.33			0.10	0.23	0.10
2009		0		0.40	0.20		0.05	0.09	0.07	0.17	0.035	0.05	0.25	0.15	0.20	0.33			0.10	0.25	0.10
2010		0		0.40	0.20		0.05	0.09	0.07	0.18	0.035	0.05	0.25	0.15	0.20	0.33			0.10	0.20	0.10
2011		0	0.30	0.40	0.20		0.05	0.09	0.07	0.18	0.035	0.05	0.25	0.15	0.20	0.33			0.10	0.20	0.10
2012		0	0.30	0.40	0.20		0.05	0.09	0.07	0.18	0.035	0.05	0.25	0.15	0.06	0.33			0.10	0.20	0.10
2013		0	0.30	0.40	0.20		0.05	0.06	0.07	0.18	0.035	0.05	0.25	0.15	0.06	0.33			0.10	0.20	0.10
2014		0.10	0.275	0.40	0.20		0.10	0.09	0.14	0.17	0.035	0.05	0.25	0.15	0.06	0.33			0.10	0.20	0.10
2015		0.10	0.30	0.40	0.20		0.10	0.09	0.14	0.17	0.035	0.05	0.25	0.15	0.06	0.33			0.10	0.20	0.10
2016	0.85	0.10	0.275	0.40	0.20		0.10	0.09	0.15	0.17	0.035	0.05	0.26	0.23	0.06	0.33			0.10	0.30	0.10
2017	0.85	0.10	0.23	0.40[b]	0.20	0.20***	0.10	0.09	0.15	0.17	0.035	0.05	0.27	0.23	0.06	0.33			0.10	0.30	0.10
2018	0.85	0.10	0.23	0.40[b]	0.20	0.20	0.18	0.09	0.15	0.17	0.035	0.05	0.27	0.23	0.06	0.33		0.03***	0.10	0.37	0.10
2019	0.85	0.10	0.23	0.40[b]	0.20	0.20	0.18	0.09	0.15	0.17	0.05	0.05	0.28	0.30	0.06	0.33		0.03***	0.10	0.39	0.17
2020	0.85	0.10	0.23	0.40[b]	0.20	0.20	0.18	0.09	0.15	0.17	0.05	0.12[c]	0.45[d]	0.30	0.06	0.33		0.03	0.10	0.40	0.17
2021	0.45	0.10	0.23	0.40[b]	0.20	0.20	0.18	0.09	0.15	0.17	0.05	0.12[c]	0.45[d]	0.30	0.06	0.33	0.10***	0.03	0.10	0.40	0.20
2022	0.45	0.25	0.305	0.70[b]	0.20	0.20	0.18	0.10	0.15	0.17	0.05	0.12[c]	0.45[d]	0.30	0.06	0.33	0.10***	0.03	0.10	0.40	0.20
2023	0.45	0.25	0.23	0.70[b]	0.20	0.20	0.20	0.10	0.15	0.17	0.05	0.12[c]	0.28	0.30	0.06	0.33	0.10	0.03	0.10	0.40	0.25

Sources: Leigh (2010); Tax Policy Center (2023): http://www.taxpolicycenter.org/statistics/state-eitc-based-federal-eitc
**Denotes non-refundable credit.
**Denotes non-refundable credit.
***Announced, but not implemented yet.
a: California has a different range of eligible income than the federal EITC.
b: DC's EITC for childless workers is worth 100% of the federal EITC and has a larger range of eligible income relative to the federal credit.
c: 25% for filers without dependent children.
d: 100% for filers without dependent children. Maryland also has the option of a 50% non-refundable EITC, but tax filers can only claim one credit.
e: Minnesota has a different structure to its state EITC that is not a direct share of the federal EITC starting in 2001. The average benefit level is listed from 2001 onward for Minnesota.
f: New York City has an additional EITC worth 5% of the federal credit.
g: Higher credit if qualifying child is under 3 (11% from 2017-2019; 12% from 2020 onward)
h: Washington's structure differs from the federal structure and credit will be calculated as a percentage of income, rather than a percentage of the federal EITC.
Wisconsin has a different rate depending on the number of children in the household.

Appendix Table 1. State EITC generosity by year, expressed as a share of the federal EITC continued

Tax Year	NY	NC	OH**	OK**	OR	RI	SC**	UT**	VT	VA**	WA	WI (1)	WI (2)	WI (3)
1986						0.22**								
1987						0.23**								
1988						0.23**			0.23					
1989						0.23**			0.25			0.05	0.25	0.75
1990						0.23**			0.28			0.05	0.25	0.75
1991						0.275**			0.28			0.05	0.25	0.75
1992						0.275**			0.28			0.05	0.25	0.75
1993						0.275**			0.28			0.05	0.25	0.75
1994	0.08					0.275**			0.25			0.044	0.208	0.625
1995	0.10					0.275**			0.25			0.04	0.16	0.50
1996	0.20					0.275**			0.25			0.04	0.14	0.43
1997	0.20				0.05**	0.275**			0.25			0.04	0.14	0.43
1998	0.20				0.05**	0.27**			0.25			0.04	0.14	0.43
1999	0.20				0.05**	0.265**			0.25			0.04	0.14	0.43
2000	0.23				0.05**	0.26**			0.32			0.04	0.14	0.43
2001	0.25				0.05**	0.255**			0.32			0.04	0.14	0.43
2002	0.28			0.05	0.05**	0.25**			0.32			0.04	0.14	0.43
2003	0.30			0.05	0.05**	0.25			0.32			0.04	0.14	0.43
2004	0.30			0.05	0.05**	0.25			0.32			0.04	0.14	0.43
2005	0.30			0.05	0.05	0.25			0.32			0.04	0.14	0.43
2006	0.30			0.05	0.05	0.25			0.32	0.20		0.04	0.14	0.43
2007	0.30			0.05	0.05	0.25			0.32	0.20		0.04	0.14	0.43
2008	0.30	0.035		0.05	0.06	0.25			0.32	0.20	0.10***	0.04	0.14	0.43
2009	0.30	0.05		0.05	0.06	0.25			0.32	0.20	0.10***	0.04	0.14	0.43
2010	0.30	0.05		0.05	0.06	0.25			0.32	0.20	0.10***	0.04	0.14	0.43
2011	0.30	0.05		0.05	0.06	0.25			0.32	0.20	0.10***	0.04	0.11	0.34
2012	0.30	0.05		0.05	0.06	0.25			0.32	0.20	0.10***	0.04	0.11	0.34
2013	0.30	0.05		0.05	0.06	0.25			0.32	0.20	0.10***	0.04	0.11	0.34
2014	0.30	0.05	0.05	0.05	0.08	0.25			0.32	0.20	0.10***	0.04	0.11	0.34
2015	0.30	0.05	0.05	0.05	0.06	0.25			0.32	0.20	0.10***	0.04	0.11	0.34
2016	0.30[f]	0	0.10	0.05	0.08	0.13			0.32	0.20	0.10***	0.04	0.11	0.34
2017	0.30[f]	0	0.10	0.05	0.08[g]	0.125	1.25***		0.32	0.20	0.10***	0.04	0.11	0.34
2018	0.30[f]	0	0.10	0.05	0.08[g]	0.15	0.2083		0.36	0.20	0.10***	0.04	0.11	0.34
2019	0.30[f]	0	0.30	0.05	0.08[g]	0.15	0.4167		0.36	0.20	0.10***	0.04	0.11	0.34
2020	0.30[f]	0	0.30	0.05	0.09[g]	0.15	0.625		0.36	0.20	0.10***	0.04	0.11	0.34
2021	0.30[f]	0	0.30	0.05	0.09[g]	0.15	0.8333		0.36	0.20	0.18-0.56***	0.04	0.11	0.34
2022	0.30[f]	0	0.30	0.05	0.09[g]	0.15	1.0417	0.15	0.36	0.20	0.18-0.56***	0.04	0.11	0.34
2023	0.30[f]	0	0.30	0.05	0.09[g]	0.15	1.25	0.15	0.38	0.15	0.18-0.56[h]	0.04	0.11	0.34

Sources: Leigh (2010); Tax Policy Center (2023): http://www.taxpolicycenter.org/statistics/state-eitc-based-federal-eitc
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c: 25% for filers without dependent children.
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f: New York City has an additional EITC worth 5% of the federal credit.
g: Higher credit if qualifying child is under 3 (11% from 2017-2019; 12% from 2020 onward)
h: Washington's structure differs from the federal structure and credit will be calculated as a percentage of income, rather than a percentage of the federal EITC. Wisconsin has a different rate depending on the number of children in the household.

Appendix Table 2. Effect of EITC exposure in childhood on poverty in adulthood, using after-tax poverty measure

	(1)	(2)	(3)
Poverty			
Above poverty	0.055**	0.054**	0.052**
	(0.024)	(0.02)	(0.023)
Above 200% of poverty	0.034*	0.031	0.026
	(0.021)	(0.021)	(0.024)
State controls		X	X
State-specific time trends			X
Number of observations	26,524	26,524	26,524

Notes: Individuals born between 1967 and 1992; observed between ages 25 and 45. Effect of the EITC measured in thousands of 2017 dollars. Each cell represents a different regression. All regressions include individual level controls for sex, race, age, age squared, state of birth, average number of siblings between birth and age 15, and birth year fixed effects and parental controls for proportion of years married between the birth of the child and age 15, educational attainment of the parent, and the average age of the head parent between the child's birth and age 15. The regression also includes state policy controls for GDP, Food Stamps/SNAP, AFDC/TANF and minimum wage rate. Standard errors (in parentheses) are clustered at the state level to account for within state correlated error terms. All results are weighted by average childhood PSID weights. Approximately 93% of variation in EITC exposure variable comes from variation in benefits by year of birth; 3% of variation comes from variation by state of birth; and 0.6% of variation comes from variation by average number of siblings in the household. * $p < 0.1$, ** $p < 0.05$, *** $p < 0.01$

Appendix Table 3. Effect of EITC exposure in childhood on fraction of years above poverty and receiving public assistance in adulthood

	(1)	(2)	(3)
Above poverty	0.050**	0.046**	0.045**
	(0.023)	(0.022)	(0.021)
Above 200% of poverty	0.053*	0.049*	0.048*
	(0.028)	(0.028)	(0.028)
TANF/AFDC	-0.007	-0.005	-0.005
	(0.005)	(0.005)	(0.005)
Food Stamps/SNAP	-0.041*	-0.033	-0.034
	(0.022)	(0.022)	(0.021)
WIC	-0.016	-0.012	-0.012
	(0.013)	(0.013)	(0.014)
Other welfare	0.000	0.001	0.001
	(0.003)	(0.003)	(0.003)
Any welfare program participation	-0.044**	-0.035	-0.036*
	(0.022)	(0.021)	(0.021)
State controls		X	X
State-specific time trends			X
Number of Observations		4,923	

Notes: Individuals born between 1967 and 1992; observed between ages 25 and 45. Effect of the EITC measured in thousands of 2017 dollars. Each cell represents a different regression. All regressions include individual level controls for sex, race, age, age squared, state of birth, average number of siblings between birth and age 15, and birth year fixed effects and parental controls for proportion of years married between the birth of the child and age 15, educational attainment of the parent, and the average age of the head parent between the child's birth and age 15. The regression also includes state policy controls for GDP, Food Stamps/SNAP, AFDC/TANF and minimum wage rate. Standard errors (in parentheses) are clustered at the state level to account for within state correlated error terms. All results are weighted by average childhood PSID weights. Approximately 93% of variation in EITC exposure variable comes from variation in benefits by year of birth; 3% of variation comes from variation by state of birth; and 0.6% of variation comes from variation by average number of siblings in the household. * $p < 0.1$, ** $p < 0.05$, *** $p < 0.01$

Appendix Table 4. Effect of EITC exposure in childhood on poverty and public assistance receipt in adulthood, Including in-utero EITC exposure

	(1)	(2)	(3)
Poverty			
Above poverty	0.055**	0.053**	0.056***
	(0.022)	(0.022)	(0.020)
Above 200% of poverty	0.054**	0.053**	0.050**
	(0.024)	(0.024)	(0.024)
Public assistance			
TANF/AFDC	-0.009	-0.006	-0.005
	(0.009)	(0.007)	(0.007)
Food Stamps/SNAP	-0.023	-0.017	-0.017
	(0.024)	(0.024)	(0.021)
WIC	-0.013	-0.009	-0.013
	(0.008)	(0.009)	(0.009)
Other welfare	-0.004	-0.003	-0.001
	(0.005)	(0.004)	(0.004)
Any welfare program participation	-0.029	-0.020	-0.022
	(0.025)	(0.024)	(0.021)
State controls		X	X
State-specific time trends			X
Number of observations	26,800	26,800	26,800

Notes: Individuals born between 1967 and 1992; observed between ages 25 and 45. Effect of the EITC measured in thousands of 2017 dollars. In-utero exposure measured as the maximum federal and state EITC available given the year, state, and number of children in the household in the year prior to the focal individual's birth. Each cell represents a different regression. All regressions include individual level controls for sex, race, age, age squared, state of birth, average number of siblings between birth and age 15, and birth year fixed effects and parental controls for proportion of years married between the birth of the child and age 15, educational attainment of the parent, and the average age of the head parent between the child's birth and age 15. The regression also includes state policy controls for GDP, Food Stamps/SNAP, AFDC/TANF and minimum wage rate. Standard errors (in parentheses) are clustered at the state level to account for within state correlated error terms. All results are weighted by average childhood PSID weights. Approximately 93% of variation in EITC exposure variable comes from variation in benefits by year of birth; 3% of variation comes from variation by state of birth; and 0.6% of variation comes from variation by average number of siblings in the household. * $p < 0.1$, ** $p < 0.05$, *** $p < 0.01$

Appendix Table 5. Effect of EITC exposure in childhood on public assistance and employment in adulthood, by parental marital status

	Parental marital status	
	Always married	Not always married
Poverty		
Above poverty	0.029	0.080**
	(0.021)	(0.037)
Above 200% of poverty	0.019	0.083**
	(0.031)	(0.037)
Public assistance		
TANF/AFDC	-0.004	-0.011
	(0.010)	(0.008)
Food Stamps/SNAP	-0.005	-0.032
	(0.022)	(0.037)
WIC	0.000	-0.019
	(0.011)	(0.016)
Other welfare	-0.002	-0.003
	(0.005)	(0.006)
Any welfare program participation	-0.004	-0.041
	(0.026)	(0.035)
State controls	X	X
Number of observations	15,257	11,543

Notes: Individuals born between 1967 and 1992; observed between ages 25 and 45. Effect of the EITC measured in thousands of 2017 dollars. Each cell represents a different regression. Always married parents represent those married in all years between the individual's birth and age 15; all else are considered not always married. All regressions include individual level controls for sex, race, age, age squared, state of birth, average number of siblings between birth and age 15, and birth year fixed effects and parental controls for proportion of years married between the birth of the child and age 15, educational attainment of the parent, and the average age of the head parent between the child's birth and age 15. The regression also includes state policy controls for GDP, Food Stamps/SNAP, AFDC/TANF and minimum wage rate. Standard errors (in parentheses) are clustered at the state level to account for within state correlated error terms. All results are weighted by average childhood PSID weights. Approximately 93% of variation in EITC exposure variable comes from variation in benefits by year of birth; 3% of variation comes from variation by state of birth; and 0.6% of variation comes from variation by average number of siblings in the household. * $p < 0.1$, ** $p < 0.05$, *** $p < 0.01$

Appendix Table 6. Effect of EITC exposure in childhood on marriage and childbearing in last observed year in PSID

	(1)	(2)	(3)
Ever married	-0.015	-0.013	-0.008
	(0.032)	(0.032)	(0.035)
Ever have a birth	-0.013	-0.008	-0.012
	(0.031)	(0.033)	(0.038)
Total number of births	-0.094	-0.079	-0.118
	(0.077)	(0.081)	(0.087)
State controls		X	X
State-specific time trends			X
Number of observations	4,923	4,923	4,923

Notes: Individuals born between 1967 and 1992. One observation per person, outcomes measured in the last year individual is observed in the data, or age 45, whichever comes first. Effect of the EITC measured in thousands of 2017 dollars. Each cell represents a different regression. All regressions include individual level controls for sex, race, age, age squared, state of birth, average number of siblings between birth and age 15, and birth year fixed effects and parental controls for proportion of years married between the birth of the child and age 15, educational attainment of the parent, and the average age of the head parent between the child's birth and age 15. The regression also includes state policy controls for GDP, Food Stamps/SNAP, AFDC/TANF and minimum wage rate. Standard errors (in parentheses) are clustered at the state level to account for within state correlated error terms. All results are weighted by average childhood PSID weights. Approximately 93% of variation in EITC exposure variable comes from variation in benefits by year of birth; 3% of variation comes from variation by state of birth; and 0.6% of variation comes from variation by average number of siblings in the household. * $p < 0.1$, ** $p < 0.05$, *** $p < 0.01$

Appendix Table 7. Effect of EITC exposure on the parents (when the respondent was a child) on parental labor force participation

Average annual hours worked by head and spouse	0.16
	(10.59)
Average annual after tax earnings by head and spouse	1,295.16***
	(400.76)
Average annual after tax family income	1,124.66***
	(391.46)
Estimated EITC benefits	104.07***
	(10.02)
State controls	X
State-specific time trends	
Number of Observations	66,603

Notes: Individuals born between 1967 and 1992; observed between ages 25 and 45. Effect of the EITC measured in thousands of 2017 dollars. Each cell represents a different regression. All regressions include individual level controls for sex, race, age, age squared, state of birth, average number of siblings between birth and age 15, and birth year fixed effects and parental controls for proportion of years married between the birth of the child and age 15, educational attainment of the parent, and the average age of the head parent between the child's birth and age 15. The regression also includes state policy controls for GDP, Food Stamps/SNAP, AFDC/TANF and minimum wage rate. Standard errors (in parentheses) are clustered at the state level to account for within state correlated error terms. All results are weighted by average childhood PSID weights. Approximately 93% of variation in EITC exposure variable comes from variation in benefits by year of birth; 3% of variation comes from variation by state of birth; and 0.6% of variation comes from variation by average number of siblings in the household. * $p < 0.1$, ** $p < 0.05$, *** $p < 0.01$

Appendix Table 8. The effect of EITC exposure in childhood on income mobility, using individual or family income

	Labor income of parent head and child head			Head and spouse income		
	(1)	(2)	(3)	(1)	(2)	(3)
Child and parent rank difference	0.034	0.031	0.019	-0.001	-0.001	-0.008
	(0.028)	(0.028)	(0.028)	(0.023)	(0.023)	(0.025)
Child has higher income rank	-0.011	-0.013	-0.036	-0.003	-0.003	-0.009
	(0.039)	(0.038)	(0.041)	(0.032)	(0.033)	(0.037)
Child and parent income difference	1,984.23	1,584.90	-195.11	-582.40	-839.92	-414.25
	(2,610.69)	(2,617.72)	(2,765.46)	(2,929.92)	(3,135.36)	(3,800.14)
Child has higher income	-0.027	-0.031	-0.051	-0.035	-0.035	-0.032
	(0.036)	(0.035)	(0.038)	(0.032)	(0.032)	(0.035)
State controls		X	X		X	X
State-specific time trends			X			X
Number of observations			4,531			

Notes: Individuals born between 1967 and 1992; observed between ages 25 and 45. Effect of the EITC measured in thousands of 2017 dollars. Income rank measured when child and parents are each between 25 and 35 years old. Each cell represents a different regression. All regressions include individual level controls for sex, race, age, age squared, state of birth, average number of siblings between birth and age 15, and birth year fixed effects and parental controls for proportion of years married between the birth of the child and age 15, educational attainment of the parent, and the average age of the head parent between the child's birth and age 15. The regression also includes state policy controls for GDP, Food Stamps/SNAP, AFDC/TANF and minimum wage rate. Standard errors (in parentheses) are clustered at the state level to account for within state correlated error terms. All results are weighted by average childhood PSID weights. Approximately 93% of variation in EITC exposure variable comes from variation in benefits by year of birth; 3% of variation comes from variation by state of birth; and 0.6% of variation comes from variation by average number of siblings in the household. * $p < 0.1$, ** $p < 0.05$, *** $p < 0.01$

Appendix Table 9. Effect of EITC exposure in childhood on public assistance receipt in adulthood—excluding top 10% of parental income distribution

	(1)	(2)	(3)
Above poverty	0.057**	0.056**	0.059***
	(0.023)	(0.023)	(0.021)
Above 200% of poverty	0.056**	0.057**	0.057**
	(0.023)	(0.024)	(0.023)
TANF/AFDC	-0.009	-0.006	-0.004
	(0.009)	(0.008)	(0.007)
Food Stamps/SNAP	-0.025	-0.020	-0.021
	(0.026)	(0.025)	(0.023)
WIC	-0.014	-0.011	-0.017
	(0.009)	(0.010)	(0.011)
Other welfare	-0.005	-0.004	-0.002
	(0.006)	(0.005)	(0.004)
Any welfare program participation	-0.032	-0.025	-0.028
	(0.027)	(0.026)	(0.022)
State controls		X	X
State-specific time trends			X
Number of Observations	25,143	25,143	25,143

Notes: Individuals born between 1967 and 1992; observed between ages 25 and 45. Effect of the EITC measured in thousands of 2017 dollars. Each cell represents a different regression. All regressions include individual level controls for sex, race, age, age squared, state of birth, average number of siblings between birth and age 15, and birth year fixed effects and parental controls for proportion of years married between the birth of the child and age 15, educational attainment of the parent, and the average age of the head parent between the child's birth and age 15. The regression also includes state policy controls for GDP, Food Stamps/SNAP, AFDC/TANF and minimum wage rate. Standard errors (in parentheses) are clustered at the state level to account for within state correlated error terms. All results are weighted by average childhood PSID weights. Approximately 93% of variation in EITC exposure variable comes from variation in benefits by year of birth; 3% of variation comes from variation by state of birth; and 0.6% of variation comes from variation by average number of siblings in the household.
* $p < 0.1$, ** $p < 0.05$, *** $p < 0.01$

Appendix Table 10. Effect of EITC exposure in childhood on poverty, public assistance receipt and labor force participation in adulthood, restricted to those who do not move across states

	(1)	(2)	(3)
Poverty			
Above poverty	0.080***	0.078**	0.073***
	(0.029)	(0.029)	(0.026)
Above 200% of poverty	0.062**	0.063**	0.045*
	(0.029)	(0.029)	(0.027)
Public assistance			
TANF	-0.014	-0.010	-0.007
	(0.013)	(0.010)	(0.009)
Food Stamps	-0.028	-0.022	-0.025
	(0.034)	(0.033)	(0.028)
WIC	-0.005	-0.002	-0.001
	(0.011)	(0.012)	(0.011)
Other welfare	-0.007	-0.006	-0.005
	(0.006)	(0.005)	(0.005)
Any welfare program participation	-0.028	-0.020	-0.018
	(0.036)	(0.035)	(0.029)
State controls		X	X
State-specific time trends			X
Number of Observations	18,587	18,587	18,587

Notes: Individuals born between 1967 and 1992; observed between ages 25 and 45. Effect of the EITC measured in thousands of 2017 dollars. Each cell represents a different regression. All regressions include individual level controls for sex, race, age, age squared, state of birth, average number of siblings between birth and age 15, and birth year fixed effects and parental controls for proportion of years married between the birth of the child and age 15, educational attainment of the parent, and the average age of the head parent between the child's birth and age 15. The regression also includes state policy controls for GDP, Food Stamps/SNAP, AFDC/TANF and minimum wage rate. Standard errors (in parentheses) are clustered at the state level to account for within state correlated error terms. All results are weighted by average childhood PSID weights. Approximately 93% of variation in EITC exposure variable comes from variation in benefits by year of birth; 3% of variation comes from variation by state of birth; and 0.6% of variation comes from variation by average number of siblings in the household. * $p < 0.1$, ** $p < 0.05$, *** $p < 0.01$

Appendix Table 11. Effect of EITC exposure in childhood on poverty and public assistance receipt in adulthood- testing different model specifications

	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)	(6)	(7)
Poverty							
Above poverty	0.053**	0.051**	0.053**	0.050**	0.061***	0.050***	0.039*
	(0.022)	(0.022)	(0.020)	(0.021)	(0.021)	(0.017)	(0.020)
Above 200% of poverty	0.054**	0.052**	0.049**	0.046*	0.054*	0.046*	0.024
	(0.024)	(0.024)	(0.024)	(0.026)	(0.030)	(0.026)	(0.028)
Public assistance							
TANF/AFDC	-0.009	-0.006	-0.005	-0.005	-0.005	-0.003	-0.008
	(0.009)	(0.007)	(0.007)	(0.008)	(0.006)	(0.008)	(0.009)
Food Stamps/SNAP	-0.022	-0.016	-0.016	-0.013	-0.019	-0.015	-0.009
	(0.024)	(0.024)	(0.022)	(0.023)	(0.024)	(0.023)	(0.021)
WIC	-0.013	-0.009	-0.013	-0.013	-0.007	-0.005	0.009
	(0.008)	(0.009)	(0.009)	(0.010)	(0.010)	(0.012)	(0.009)
Other welfare	-0.004	-0.003	-0.002	-0.002	-0.002	-0.003	-0.005
	(0.005)	(0.004)	(0.004)	(0.004)	(0.004)	(0.004)	(0.004)
Any welfare program participation	-0.029	-0.020	-0.022	-0.019	-0.024	-0.019	-0.005
	(0.025)	(0.024)	(0.021)	(0.023)	(0.023)	(0.023)	(0.022)
State controls		X	X	X	X	X	X
State-specific time trends			X	X	X	X	X
FSP, Medicaid, additional TANF, welfare waivers				X			
Birth year time trends*demographics					X		
Birth year*number of siblings FE						X	
Birth year*state FE							X
Number of observations	26,755	26,755	26,755	26,354	26,800	26,800	26,800

Notes: Individuals born between 1967 and 1992; observed between ages 25 and 45. Effect of the EITC measured in thousands of 2017 dollars. Each cell represents a different regression. All regressions include individual level controls for sex, race, age, age squared, state of birth, average number of siblings between birth and age 15, and birth year fixed effects and parental controls for proportion of years married between the birth of the child and age 15, educational attainment of the parent, and the average age of the head parent between the child's birth and age 15. The regression also includes state policy controls for GDP, Food Stamps/SNAP, AFDC/TANF and minimum wage rate. Standard errors (in parentheses) are clustered at the state level to account for within state correlated error terms. All results are weighted by average childhood PSID weights. Approximately 93% of variation in EITC exposure variable comes from variation in benefits by year of birth; 3% of variation comes from variation by state of birth; and 0.6% of variation comes from variation by average number of siblings in the household. * $p < 0.1$, ** $p < 0.05$, *** $p < 0.01$

Appendix Table 12. Effect of EITC exposure in childhood on poverty and public assistance receipt in adulthood - federal versus state EITC variation

	Federal	State
Poverty		
Above poverty	0.062**	0.032
	(0.024)	(0.058)
Above 200% of poverty	0.063**	0.035
	(0.024)	(0.059)
Public assistance		
TANF	-0.007	-0.004
	(0.009)	(0.011)
Food Stamps	-0.020	-0.007
	(0.021)	(0.065)
WIC	-0.008	-0.018
	(0.011)	(0.026)
Other welfare	-0.004	0.001
	(0.005)	(0.007)
Any welfare program participation	-0.023	-0.020
	(0.022)	(0.067)
Number of Observations	26,800	26,800

Notes: Individuals born between 1967 and 1992; observed between ages 25 and 45. Effect of the EITC measured in thousands of 2017 dollars. Each cell represents a different regression. All regressions include individual level controls for sex, race, age, age squared, state of birth, average number of siblings between birth and age 15, and birth year fixed effects and parental controls for proportion of years married between the birth of the child and age 15, educational attainment of the parent, and the average age of the head parent between the child's birth and age 15. The regression also includes state policy controls for GDP, Food Stamps/SNAP, AFDC/TANF and minimum wage rate. Standard errors (in parentheses) are clustered at the state level to account for within state correlated error terms. All results are weighted by average childhood PSID weights. Approximately 93% of variation in EITC exposure variable comes from variation in benefits by year of birth; 3% of variation comes from variation by state of birth; and 0.6% of variation comes from variation by average number of siblings in the household. * $p < 0.1$, ** $p < 0.05$, *** $p < 0.01$

Appendix Table 13: Effect of EITC exposure in childhood on SNAP pre and post 2009

	(1)	(2)	(3)
Panel A			
Food Stamps Pre-2009	0.034	0.051	0.065
	(0.053)	(0.050)	(0.054)
State controls		X	X
State-specific time trends			X
Number of Observations	10,919	10,919	10,919
Panel B			
Food Stamps Post-2009	-0.046**	-0.040**	-0.042**
	(0.019)	(0.019)	(0.019)
State controls		X	X
State-specific time trends			X
Number of Observations	12,832	12,832	12,832

Notes: Individuals born between 1967 and 1992; observed between ages 25 and 45. Effect of the EITC measured in thousands of 2017 dollars. Each cell represents a different regression. All regressions include individual level controls for sex, race, age, age squared, state of birth, average number of siblings between birth and age 15, and birth year fixed effects and parental controls for proportion of years married between the birth of the child and age 15, educational attainment of the parent, and the average age of the head parent between the child's birth and age 15. The regression also includes state policy controls for GDP, Food Stamps/SNAP, AFDC/TANF and minimum wage rate. Standard errors (in parentheses) are clustered at the state level to account for within state correlated error terms. All results are weighted by average childhood PSID weights. Approximately 93% of variation in EITC exposure variable comes from variation in benefits by year of birth; 3% of variation comes from variation by state of birth; and 0.6% of variation comes from variation by average number of siblings in the household. * $p < 0.1$, ** $p < 0.05$, *** $p < 0.01$